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I. Introduction
The federal law of fraud traditionally has demonstrated a dynamic quality
that has allowed it to capture new forms of criminality. This flexibility stems
from judicial reluctance to confine fraud to its narrow common law roots.
Thus, federal judges have observed that "[t]he law does not define fraud; it
needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable [sic] as human
ingenuity."
1
This observation finds further support in the pragmatic approach Con-
gress took in crafting the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. Rather than
limit these statutes to classic common-law fraud based upon a misrepresenta-
tion between two parties,2 the mail and wire fraud prohibitions reach any
"scheme to defraud" that depends upon the United States mail' or interstate
1. Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958) (quoting Weiss v. United
States, 122 F.2d 675,681 (5th Cir. 1941)). The Eighth Circuit once observed that "we recog-
nize that the forms of fraud are as multifarious as human ingenuity can devise; that courts
consider it difficult, if not impossible, to formulate an exact, definite and all-inclusive definition
thereof, and that each case must be determined on its own facts." Isaacs v. United States, 301
F.2d 706,713 (8th Cir. 1962).
2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1965).
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law
for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon
it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by
justable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
Id. (emphasis added).
State common law requirements for fraudulent misrepresentation are similar. In Minne-
sota, for example, the common law requires:
(1) there must be a representation; (2) that representation must be false; (3) it must
have to do with a past or present fact, (4) that fact must be material; (5) it must be
susceptible of knowledge; (6) the representer must know it to be false... ; (7) the
representer- must intend to have the other person induced to act, or justified in
acting upon it; (8) that person must be so induced to act or so justified in acting;
(9) that person's action must be in reliance upon the representation; (10) that
person must suffer damage, (11) that damage must be attributable to the misrepre-
sentation, that is, the statement must be the proximate cause of the injury.
Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 174 n.4 (Minn. 1986) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (defining mail fraud). In 1994, Congress amended the
statute to include certain private carriers within its prohibitions. The inserted language is: "or
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wire facilities.4 Congress based the mail fraud statute on common law cheat-
ing (rather than on obtaiing money by false pretenses or deceit), which
neither required proof or reliance nor applied only to two-party transactions.5
Subsequently, Congress reinforced its broad approach to mail fraud through
a series of amendments expanding the statute's scope.6 As a result, even
fraudulent schemes that do not involve a victim's reliance on misrepresenta-
tion may fall within the purview of the mail and wire fraud statutes." Given
the capacity of the human mind to invent new ways of cheating business
deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any
private or commercial interstate carrier." The Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2087,2147. , ....
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away,
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated
or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or autho-
rized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or deliv-
ered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or
takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place
at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be
fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Id.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994) (defining wire fraud).
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings,
signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not
more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Id.
5. See Courtney Chetty Genco, Note, Whatever Happened to Durland?: Mail Fraud,
RICO, and Justifiable Reliance, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 355-56 (1992) (discussing
legislative history and drafting of original mail fraud statute).
6. See id. at 369 (noting "Congress' continuing purpose not to permit the reach of the
mail fraud statute to be circumscribed"); see also Jed S. Rakoff, The FederalMailFraud Statute
(Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 772 (1980) (noting that Congress consistently has endorsed
broad application of mail fraud statute).
7. See infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text (listing examples of non-reliance fraudu-
lent schemes covered by mail and wire fraud statutes).
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competitors, consumers, family, and friends, Congress" and the courts9 have
recognized that reasonable reliance should not be a prerequisite to culpability
for fraudulent conduct.
The absence of the reliance element has proven to be a hallmark of
federal fraud jurisprudence. By not requiring proof of reliance in mail and
wire fraud cases, Congress provided "a 'stop gap' device which permits the
prosecution of newly-conceived fraud until such time that Congress enact[s]
particularized legislation to cope with the new frauds."' ° With this "stop
gap" feature, federal law can reach fraudulent schemes1 involving bribery, 2
embezzlement, 3 misappropriation of information, 4 manipulation of con-
tract payments," unauthorized selling of satellite broadcast descrambling
8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994) (including no mention of reliance in definition
of mail and wire fraud). See generally Genco, supra note 5 (describing historical development
of mail fraud statute).
9. Several courts have ruled that reliance is not a required element of scheme to defraud.
See, e.g., Schreider Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.
1986) (noting that essential elements of mail and wire fraud are (1) formation of scheme to
defraud, (2) use of United States mails or wires in carrying out schemes, and (3) intent to
defraud); United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1216 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming mail fraud
conviction for filing falsified tax returns); United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065, 1066 (8th
Cir. 1974) (affirming mail fraud conviction for filing falsified tax returns and noting broad scope
and "ever-expanding role" of mail fraud statute); Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 138
(9th Cir. 1967) ("It is only necessary to prove that... [the] scheme [is] reasonably calculated to
deceive, and that the mail service of the United States was used and intended to be used in the
execution of the scheme."); see also Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1896)
(concluding that mail fraud statute's "scheme to defraud" is not limited by common law interpre-
tations).
10. United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 n.5 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting United
States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395,405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). In Maze, Chief Justice
Burger noted in dissent, 'When a 'new' fraud develops - as constantly happens - the mail fraud
statute becomes a stopping device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until
particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil." Maze, 414
U.S. at 405-06.
11. "The aspect of the scheme to 'defraud' is measured by a nontechnical standard. It is
a reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the
general and business life of members of society." Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109
(5th Cir. 1958).
12. See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (concluding that
scheme to bribe public officials is "scheme to defraud" for purposes of mail fraud statute).
13. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) ("The concept of 'fraud'
includes the act of embezzlement, which is 'the fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of
the money or goods entrusted to one's care by another."' (citation omitted)).
14. See id. at 28 ("We have little trouble in holding that the conspiracy here to trade on the
Journal's confidential information is not outside the reach of the mail and wire fraud statutes.").
15. See Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 1989)
(affirming mail fraud convictions of defendants who manipulated contract payments to defraud
subcontractors).
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devices, 6 check kiting, 7 money laundering,' 8 kickback schemes,1 9 and many
others2" - many of which arise in complex third party transactions and all of
which potentially inflict injury upon victims who have not relied upon any
fraudulent misrepresentations. Until relatively recently, this pragmatic - and
vital - feature of federal mail and wire fraud enjoyed widespread support.
Indeed, it still does insofar as federal criminal law is concerned. 21 However,
a major development in civil litigation under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) law threatens to revive narrow common-law
constructions of fraud._ This trend potentially may undermine fraud victims'
recovery efforts by imposing a reliance requirement upon them irrespective
ofwhether their injury stemmedfrom fraudulent misrepresentations.3 As not
all frauds involve misrepresentations made directly between two parties,
24
reading a reliance requirement into all mail and wire fraud civil RICO cases
potentially excludes vast categories of fraud from relief in federal court.
This Article explores the origin of this development and presents an
alternative analysis - based on well-established causation principles - that
16. See United States v. Manzer, 69 F.3d 222,226-27 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming mail and
wire fraud convictions for selling satellite broadcasting decryption devices).
17. See United States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618, 627 (1 th Cir. 1990) (upholding mail fraud
conviction for check-kiting scheme).
18. See United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding that
allegation of use of mail in furtherance of money laundering scheme was sufficient to support
mail fraud indictment).
19. See United States v. Fischl, 797 F.2d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming mail fraud
conviction for kickback scheme).
20. See McClendon v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1506-09 (1985) (collecting
cases); Genco, supra note 5, at 365-67 (same); see also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,
27 (1987) (stating that "[slections 1341 and 1343 reach any scheme to deprive another of money
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretense, representations, or promises").
21. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (observing that neither Congress nor
courts have included reliance as required element of mail or wire fraud offense).
22. See infra Part V (discussing how courts have read reliance into RICO statute).
23. See inffra Part V (discussing rift over reliance in circuit courts).
24. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text (listing examples of fraudulent schemes
that do not necessarily entail victims' reliance on misrepresentation). At common law there was
and continues to be a variety of fraudulent offenses that do not necessarily involve misrepresen-
tations made between two parties. One example is larceny, which is defined as "the (1) tres-
passory, (2) taking and (3) carrying away of the (4) personal property (5) of another (6) with
intent to steal it." Genco, supra note 5, at 338. Another example is embezzlement, which is
defined as "the fraudulent conversion of the property of another by one who was already in
lawful possession of it" Id. at 344 (citation omitted).
25. Two simple examples would be larceny and embezzlement. See supra note 24 (giving
examples). It also excludes complex multi-party frauds in which the principal victim had no con-
tact with the perpetrator of the scheme. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text (listing
examples of fraudulent schemes that do not necessarily involve any two-party misrepresentations).
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allows the federal mail and wire fraud statutes to retain their utility in civil
RICO cases. Part II provides an overview of civil RICO and explains its role
in combating systemic fraud. Part IlI considers the courts' largely negative
response to RICO commercial fraud litigation and reviews efforts to rein in the
statute through unduly narrow judicial interpretations. Part IV sets the context
of the debate by reviewing the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes v. SIPC,6
upon which lower courts have erroneously premised their rulings that RICO
requires proof of reliance. Part V traces the role of reliance in fraud litigation,
details why reliance is not an element of mail and wire fraud, and explains how
the courts have nevertheless read reliance into the RICO statute. Finally, Part
VI proposes a remedy that relies upon traditional common-law principles to
resolve the proximate cause issue in civil RICO litigation.
I. The Nature and Structure of Civil RICO: Combating Fraud
Through Civil Litigation
Congress enacted RICO as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970.' Although conceived in a context principally concerned with
organized crime, RICO transcends this narrow legislative mche.' Rather, the
statute sweeps broadly, striking at all forms of "enterprise criminality"'29 by
26. 503 U.S. 258,283 (1992).
27. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
28. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,499 (1985).
Congress wanted to reach both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises. The
former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity
from its consequences. The fact that § 1964(c) is used against respected busi-
nesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct
is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is being misconstrued.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Michael Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern": The Search for
"Continuing Plus Relationship," 73 CORNELLL. REV. 971, 975 (1988).
Significantly, however, RICO does not limit the enterprise element to illicit groups
such as organized crime families. Instead, the law suggests that an enterprise may
include both licit and illicit organizations .... Racketeering activity is explicitly
defined to include various types of frauds and other misconduct often committed
by white collar criminals.
Id.
29. "Enterprise criminality" has been defined as "all types of organized criminal be-
havior ...from simple political corruption to sophisticated white-collar crime schemes to
traditional Mafia-type endeavors." United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir.
1983) (quoting (. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations (RICO): Basic Concepts -Criminal and CivilRemedies, 53 TEMP. L. REV.. 1009,1013-
14 (1980)). See generally Goldsmith, supra note 28 (discussing broad scope of RICO's "enter-
prise" element).
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providing enhanced criminal penalties and civil remedies against any violator
who uses or abuses an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 0
The statute contains three central prohibitions: (a) section 1962(a) of
Title 18 makes it illegal for a person who has engaged in a "pattern of racke-
teering activity" to invest its proceeds in the acquisition or operation of an
enterprise;3 (b) section 1962(b) outlaws acquiring or maintaining an interest
in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; 32 and (c) section
1962(c) prohibits conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity.3 3  Significantly, nothing in its text limits RICO to
traditional organized crime3 On the contrary, Congress defined the elements
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994). It is also a violation of RICO to conspire to conduct,
acquire, or maintain an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or its proceeds. 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1994).
31. See id. § 1962(a). The subsection reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign .commerce. A
purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without
the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of
assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the
securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate
family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the
collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate
to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one lass, and do not confer,
either in the law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
Id.
32. Id. § 1962(b). The subsection reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person through a
pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
33. Id. § 1962(c). The subsection reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.
Id.
34. See H.J., Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243-49 (1989) ("[T]he argument
for reading an organized crime limitation into RICO's pattern concept, whatever the merits and
demerits of such a limitation as an initial legislative matter, finds no support in the Act's text,
and is at odds with the tenor of its legislative history."). In footnote five, the Court noted that
lower courts had also rejected arguments that RICO is limited to organized crime only. Id. at
244 n.5 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 492 n.32 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd,
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of RICO in terms not limited to organized crime. For example, neither the
"person"35 nor "enterprise 36 elements hint at an organized crime limitation,7
and Congress explicitly defined "racketeering activity" to include a host of
crimes - such as mail and wire fraud - traditionally associated with white-
collar crime.
31
Thus, RICO clearly targeted white-collar criminals. Moreover, to pro-
mote application of the statute, Congress included a civil remedy providing
treble damages plus reasonable attorneys' fees to victims who could establish
that their business or property had been injured "by reason of a violation of
section 1962.1 31 Congress thereby sought to encourage private enforcement
actions that would supplement scarce prosecutorial resources.' Based on the
473 U.S. 479 (1985); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5,21 (2d Cir. 1983); Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353-56 (7th Cir. 1983)).
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1994) (defining "person" as "any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property"). Courts have given the term
"persons" wide application. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 226 (7th Cir.
1997) (finding that corporation is "person"); Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 204 (5th Cir. 1995)
(finding that partner in joint farming venture is "person"); Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941
F.2d 1271, 1281-82 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that unincorporated association is "person");
County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding
that public utility is "person"); George v. Blue Diamond Petroleum, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 539, 545
(W.D. La. 1989), affd, 922 F.2d 838 (1989) (finding that sellers of oil and gas interests are
"persons"); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel. Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 243 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding that
cable television companies are "persons"); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540
F. Supp. 673, 681-82 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (finding that estate of alleged wrongdoer is "person").
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994) (defining "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity"). The statutory definition addresses legal "enterprises" in the
first clause and illegal "enterprises" in the second clause. The argument that RICO was meant to
only encompass criminal associations is not supported by the statute's definition of "enterprise."
37. Courts consistently have held that the "enterprise" could be either legitimate or illegit-
imate. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (observing that
"Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises"); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (concluding that RICO applies to both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 626 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); United States
v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Unites States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564,
568 (9th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976) (same).
38. See U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1994) (defining "racketeering activity" to include white-
collar crimes including mail fraud, wire fraud, financial institution fraud, bribery, and embez-
zling pension, welfare, or union funds in addition to typical criminal activities, such as murder
and witness intimidation).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
40. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,283 (1992) ("By including a
private right of action in RICO, Congress intended to bring 'the pressure of "private attorneys
general" on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources were deemed
inadequate.'" (quoting Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987))).
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treble damage model employed by the antitrust laws, Congress intended that
an army of private attorneys general would help federal prosecutors combat
all forms of enterprise criminality.4"
From a policy standpoint, RICO made good sense. The legislative record
established that traditional enforcement efforts had proven ineffective.42 By
1970, organized crime had become entrenched in American society,43 and
white-collar fraud drained billions of dollars annually from the economy.44
Existing private remedies afforded scant relief, as litigation costs and attor-
neys' fees depleted most recoveries to such an extent that victims had little
incentive to sue.45 By providing treble damages plus counsel fees, RICO both
41. See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557-58 (2000) (observing that both antitrust and
RICO "statutes share a common congressional objective of encouraging civil litigation to sup-
plement government efforts to deter and penalize the respectively prohibited practices"). The
Rotella Court further noted, "The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims
but to turn them into prosecutors, 'private attorneys general,' dedicated to eliminating racketeer-
ing activity." Id. at 557; see also Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 187 (1997) (noting
that civil RICO has "further purpose [of] encouraging potential private plaintiffs diligently to
investigate").
42. See THEPRESIDENT'SCOMMISSIONONLAWENFORCEMENTANDADMNISTRATIONOF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORoANIZE CRIME 14-16 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
REPORT]. The task force indicated that there were several reasons why control efforts had failed.
Among the reasons given were difficulties in obtaining proof, lack of resources, lack of exper-
ience, lack of coordination, failure to develop strategic intelligence, failure to use available sanc-
tions, and lack of public and political commitment. Id. at 14-16.
43. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 1-5 (describing pervasive reach of orga-
nized crime). Organized crime
involves thousands of criminals, working within structures as complex as those of
any large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than those of legitimate
governments. Its actions are not impulsive but rather the result of intricate conspir-
acies, carried on over many years and aimed at gaining control over whole fields
of activities in order to amass huge profits.
Id. at 1. "[O]rganized crime is also extensively and deeply involved in legitimate business and
in labor unions." Id.; see also Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91452, 84 Stat.
922,922 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (noting in statement of findings
and purpose that "organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy").
44. See Genco, supra note 5, at 390 ("In 1974 the United States Chamber of Commerce
estimated the direct economic cost of fraud as $41.78 billion annually."). Losses due to fraud
continued to increase into the 1980's. See Michael Goldsmith & Vicki Rinne, Civil RICO,
Foreign Defendants, and "ET "73 MINN. L. REv. 1023,1041 n.67 (1989) (noting that Depart-
ment of Justice has estimated annual fraud losses at more than $200 billion).
45. Assume that a plaintiffhas been defrauded of$50,000. Further assume that the defen-
dant is a large company or other organization with extensive resources. Without the provision
for treble damages and attorneys' fees, such a plaintiff could never hope to recover more than
a small portion of the $50,000 lost, especially if the case goes to trial. See, e.g., Robert H.
Lande,Are Antitrust 'Treble"DamagesReally Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115,158-72
(1993) (arguing that after appropriate adjustment to treble damage awards for factors such as
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motivated victims to seek judicial redress and raised the financial stakes for
those considering enterprise criminality.
Ultimately, however, RICO received a bifurcated judicial response that
generally distinguished between its criminal and civil applications.' As early
criminal RICO cases often featured indictments of high level mobsters47 and
prominent public officials charged with corruption," most courts interpreted
the law broadly to facilitate prosecutions they considered well within RICO's
statutory purpose. In short, judges enthusiastically embraced the proposition
that the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 applies to organized crime and
its counterparts. 49 As a result, RICO flourished in its criminal context.
50
attorney fees and lack of prejudgment interest, damages awarded are probably only equal to
actual damages in anti-trust cases).
46. Courts embraced RICO as written when applying its provisions to criminal activity.
See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22-24 (1983) (giving broad construction to RICO's
criminal forfeiture provisions). The Russello Court stated, "The legislative history clearly
demonstrates that the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented
scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots." Id. at 26; see also United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-93 (1981) (reading RICO's criminal provisions liberally).
The Turkette Court observed, "Congress was well aware that it was entering a new domain of
federal involvement through the enactment of [RICO]. Indeed, the very purpose of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970 was to enable the federal government to address a large and
seemingly neglected problem." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586.
Judicial support for the use of RICO in the civil context has been lukewarm at best. See
Michael Goldsmith, Judicial Immunity for White-Collar Crime: The Ironic Demise of Civil
RICO, 30 HARe. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2-3 nn. 9 & 11 (1993) (noting that in 1985 and 1986, approxi-
mately 50% of RICO claims were dismissed completely and that 77% of civil RICO claims were
dismissed completely in first half of 1991). Additionally, lower courts have endeavored to place
judicial limitations on civil RICO unwarranted by statutory language or purpose. See infra Part
I (discussing various restrictions lower courts have read into RICO in civil context); see also
Jeffrey E. Grell, Exorcising RICO From Product Litigation, 24 WM. MrrCHEIL L. REV. 1089,
1102-07 (1998) (explaining lower court attempts to contain RICO's civil scope and Supreme
Court rejection of such limitations); infra Part V (discussing lower court imposition of reliance
requirement upon civil RICO claims).
47. See United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 965 (1st Cir. 1988) (broadly construing
RICO and government's prosecutory powers in prosecution of Boston organized crime boss).
See generally GERARD O'NEILL & DICK LEER, THE UNDERBOSS: THE RME AND FALL OF A
MAFIA FAMILY (1989) (detailing RICO prosecution of Angiulo family); Blakey & Qettings,
supra note 29, at 1023-25 nn. 85-88 (listing variety of enterprises that prosecutors have attacked
using RICO's criminal provisions).
48. 'See United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming RICO
bribery conviction of congressman); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 611 (3d Cir. 1982)
(en banc) (affirming RICO bribery conviction of city councilman).
49. See Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E.
Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774,799 n.184 (1988) (noting that "RICO has been used to convict
the leadership structure of organized crime families in Boston, Buffalo, Kansas City, Cleveland,
Los Angeles, New Orleans, Philadelphia, Rochester, and New York City"). During oral
arguments in Turkette, one Justice asked, "Isn't [RICO] one of the broadest nets that Congress
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In civil cases, however, many judges seemed to accept the premise that
RICO is limited to organized crime. Thus, when applied civilly to white-collar
businesses accused of commercial fraud, these judges viewed the statute
skeptically as an anti-mafia law run amuck. 1 This view prompted many courts
to saddle civil RICO with a series ofjudicially imposed limitations.
HI. Civil RICO in the Courts: Judicially-Imposed Restrictions
Given the powerful criminal and civil sanctions potentially available
under RICO, virtually all defendants against whom the statute initially was
has ever thrown outto catch criminal activity?" 1981 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 66, *37 (1981).
50. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-93 (interpreting broadly scope of RICO's criminal
provisions); see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 29, at 1023-25 & nn. 85-88 (1980) (listing
variety of enterprises that prosecutors have attacked using RICO's criminal provisions).
51. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 529-30 (1985) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) ("Only a small fraction of the scores of civil RICO cases now being brought implicate
organized crime in any way. Typically, these suits are being brought - in the unfettered dis-
cretion of private litigants - in federal court against legitimate businesses seeking treble dam-
ages in ordinary fraud and contract cases."); see also In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liab.
Lifig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1470-71 (D. Colo. 1987):
RICO is a recurring nightmare for federal courts across the country. Like the
Flying Dutchman, the statute refuses to be put to rest. Beating against the wind, it
has jettisoned an effusion of opinions which bobble in its wake. In a vain attempt
to drop anchor in this sea of confusion, I have made my position known.
... I have similarly remarked from the bench that "RICO is just in my view,
a rather sloppily thought out kind of way to get the Mafia that everybody jumps on
so that they can have more fun with fraud."
Id.
Scholastic criticism of RICO abounds. See Grell, supra note 46, at 1089 (describing
RICO's language as "wildly broad" Grell notes:
More recently, RICO has become an increasingly common claim in product-
related litigation. This strange phenomenon is only one natural outgrowth of the
many non-traditional uses that creative plaintiffs' lawyers have found for RICO.
The RICO "person" is no longer the hit man, but the corporate entity that manufac-
tures a product. The "enterprise" is not the crime family but the network of retailers
and dealers that sell the manufacturer's product
Id. at 1092; see also Philip A. Lacovara & Geoffrey F. Aronow, The Legal Shakedown ofLegit-
imate Business People: The Runaway Provsons ofPrivate Civil NJCO, 21 NEw ENG. L. REV.
1 (1985-86) (criticizing abuse of RICO in civil litigation). Lacovara and Aronow state:
Without any of the restraint and responsibility that governs the decisions of
public prosecutors, private lawyers are invoking civil RICO on behalf of private
clients to level charges of "racketeering" against reputable businessmen and profes-
sionals such as investment bankers, brokers, and accountants. Although RICO was
intended to protect legitimate business, the statute is now being used almost
exclusively to attack established businesses and firms. The threat to bring a
"racketeering" charge sometimes coerces settlements before the filing of a RICO
complaint, while the actual filing of a RICO complaint exposes businessmen to
continuing embarrassment and expense.
Id. at 3.
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employed argued that Congress did not intend the law to apply to them. Thus,
organized criminals astonishingly argued that RICO did not reach wholly
illicit groups, 2 while white-collar defendants maintained that the statute
applied only to wholly illicit groups. 3 To date, the organized crime defen-
dants generally have failed in their efforts to restrict the statute's reach. 4
However, at least in civil cases, white-collar defendants have enjoyed remark-
able success in convincing judges to read various limitations into RICO. 5
In perhaps the most brazen effort to restrict the statute, defendants
persuaded a district court to rule that RICO applies only to cases involving
organized crime. 6 Although this view has been thoroughly rejected, it dem-
onstrates the extent to which some judges would reach to restrict civil RICO
in white-collar cases. Other efforts followed. Thus, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found that civil RICO requires a prior conviction and a
52. See Goldsmith, supra note 49, at 778 n.36 (quoting Gennaro Angiulo, then boss of
Boston crime family, on hearing theory that RICO was limited to legitimate businesses: "We're
off the hook. We can do anything we want. They can stick RICO."); Barry Tarlow, RICO: The
New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 191-92 n.139 (1980)
(citing various court decisions rejecting limiting application of RICO to infiltration of legitimate
businesses). In United States v. Turkette, the Court rejected the argument that RICO was
inapplicable to illegitimate enterprises:
On appeal, the respondent argued that RICO was intended solely to protect
legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers and that RICO does
not make criminal the participation in an association which performs only illegal
acts and which has not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise.
The Court of Appeals agreed. We reverse.
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 579-80 (1981).
53. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (rejecting notion that RICO was meant only to
apply to illegitimate businesses).
54. See, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 52, at 191-92 n.139 (citing various court decisions
rejecting limiting application of RICO to infiltration of legitimate businesses).
55. The Supreme Court has rejected several such attempts to restrict civil RICO. Exam-
ples include arguments that RICO did not apply to illegitimate businesses, Turkette, 452 U.S.
at 580, that RICO required prior criminal conviction and separate "racketeering injury," Sedima,
473 U.S. at 493-95, that RICO required proof of multiple schemes, H.J., Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1989), and that RICO required that the "enterprise" have an eco-
nomic objective, Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249,260 (1994).
56. See Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (concluding that
RICO did not apply to large corporate defendant). The Barr court observed:
It is clear that [RICO] was aimed not at legitimate business organizations but at
combating "a society of criminals who seek to operate outside of the control of the
American people and their governments." There is no question that defendant
cannot be so characterized.
Accordingly, we find plaintiff's proposed third claim for relief specious,
frivolous, and without merit ....
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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unique "racketeering injury," such that only indirectly injured parties could
sue previously convicted felons. 7 These limitations would have eviscerated
the statute, as very few white-collar defendants charged with civil RICO viola-
tions have incurred prior convictions,58 and hardly anyone could define, much
less allege, an indirect injury claim that satisfied the "racketeering injury"
requirement.59 In Sedima, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected both of these
57. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrcx Co., 741 F.2d 482, 502 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd and
remanded, 473 U.S. 479 (1985) ("The most logical conclusion to be drawn is that Congress
expected the criminality of the predicate acts to be proved before the private action went for-
ward - that a criminal conviction must precede a private civil suit."). Other circuits rejected the
requirement of a prior RICO conviction. See Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Bus. Forms, Inc.,
713 F.2d 1272, 1287 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that criminal conviction is not condition
precedent to civil RICO claim); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95
n.I (6th Cir. 1982) (same).
In addition to requiring a prior RICO conviction, the Second Circuit also required a "rack-
eteering injury." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494-95. "By analogy, then, the 'by reason of' language
in section 1964(c) is intended to limit standing to those injured by a 'racketeering injury,' by
an injury of the type RICO was designed to prevent." Id. at 495. The Seventh Circuit rejected
the "racketeering injury" requirement. See Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting "racketeering injury" requirement), affd
per curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
58. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493 (noting reasons guilty party may escape prosecution and
that prior conviction requirement would be inconsistent with congressional policy). On this
point, the Sedima Court stated:
Finally, we note that a prior-conviction requirement would be inconsistent with
Congress' underlying policy concerns. Such a rule would severely handicap
potential plaintiffs. A guilty party may escape conviction for a number of
reasons - not least among them the possibility that the Government itself may
choose to pursue only civil remedies. Private attorney general provisions such as
§ 1964(c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps.
Id.
59. See id. at 495 (calling "racketeering injury" requirement "amorphous"). On this point,
the Sedima Court said:
If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbid-
den by these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his
business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c). There is no room
in the statutory language for an additional, amorphous "racketeering injury"
requirement.
Id. (emphasis added).
In considering the Court of Appeals second prerequisite for a private civil
RICO action - "injury. . . caused by an activity which RICO was designed to
deter" - we are somewhat hampered by the vagueness of that concept. Apart from
reliance on the general purposes of RICO and a reference to "mobsters," the court
provided scant indication of what the requirement of racketeering injury means.
Id. at 493-94. "The court below is not alone in struggling to define 'racketeering injury,' and
the difficulty of the task itself cautions against imposing such a requirement." Id. at 494; see
also Haroco, Inc., 747 F.2d at 399 (calling racketeering injury requirement "elusive").
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restrictions as unwarranted by the statutory text,'c unintended by Congress,61
and undesirable from a policy standpoint.62 In reaching this conclusion, the
60. The Sedima Court found that RICO's statutes were devoid of a prior conviction
requirement. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488 ("The language of RICO gives no obvious indication
that a civil action can proceed only after a criminal conviction."). "As defined in the statute,
racketeering activity consists not of acts for which the defendant has been convicted, but of acts
for which he could be." Id. "The word 'conviction' does not appear in any relevant portion of
the statute." Id. The Sedima Court concluded:
Thus, a prior-conviction requirement cannot be found in the definition of "racke-
teering activity." Nor can it be found in § 1962, which sets out the statute's
substantive provisions. Indeed if either § 1961 or § 1962 did contain such a
requirement, a prior conviction would also be a prerequisite, nonsensically, for a
criminal prosecution, or for a civil action by the Government to enjoin violations
that had not yet occurred.
Id.
The Sedima Court also noted that RICO itself contained no "racketeering injury" require-
ment. See id. at 495 (finding that RICO's statutory language does not support "racketeering
injury" requirement). On this point, the Sedima Court said:
[We are initially doubtful about a requirement of a "racketeering injury" separate
from the harm from the predicate acts. A reading of the statute belies any such
requirement. ... "If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in
a manner forbidden by these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the
plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c).
There is no room in the statutory language for an additional, amorphous "racketeer-
ing injury" requirement.
Id.
61. The Sedima Court rejected the notion that Congress intended that civil RICO include
a prior conviction requirement. See id. at 489-93 (noting that neither legislative history nor
avoidance of practical and constitutional concerns justified inference of prior conviction
requirement). "When Congress intended that the defendant have been previously convicted, it
said so." Id. at 489 n.7. "The legislative history also undercuts the reading of the court
below .... The only specific reference in the legislative history to prior convictions of which
we are aware is an objection that the treble damages provision is too broad precisely because
'there need not be a conviction under any of these laws for it to be racketeering.'" Id. at 489-90
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
The Sedima Court also rejected the argument that Congress wished to impose a "racke-
tecring injury" requirement in civil RICO. See id. at 495 (finding that statutory language of
RICO does not support "racketeering injury" requirement). "Congress' 'inklings' are best
determined by the statutory language it chooses, and the language it chose here extends far
beyond the limits drawn by the Court of Appeals." Id. at 496 n.13.
62. See id. at 490-93 (noting that requiring prior criminal conviction was unwise from
policy standpoint).
[C]riminal convictions are often limited to a small portion of the actual or possible
charges. The decision below would also create peculiar incentives for plea bargain-
ing to non-predicate-act offenses so as to ensure immunity from a later civil suit.
If nothing else, a criminal defendant might plead to a tiny fraction of counts, so as
to limit future civil liability.
Id. at 490 n.9. "[A] prior-conviction requirement would be inconsistent with Congress' under-
lying policy concerns. Such a rule would severely handicap potential plaintiffs." Id. at 493.
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Court also stressed that Congress directed that RICO should be "liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."63 Finally, the Court cautioned
lower courts not to restrict the statute through artificial rules and warned
federal judges that, to the extent RICO might be too broad or otherwise
flawed, only Congress - and not the judiciary - may rewrite it.'
Notwithstanding this directive, lower courts continued to read their own
restrictions into civil RICO. For example, after Sedima, some courts con-
strued RICO's pattern element rigidly to preclude relief for victims of long-
term frauds that fell short of an artificially contrived "multiple scheme"
standard.65 When the Supreme Court rejected this standard as unwarranted
and unwise in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.," lower courts
The Sediama Court also found public policy problems with a "racketeering injury" require-
ment. See id. at 493-500 (discussing reasons for rejecting narrowing of "racketeering injury"
requirement). "Far from effectuating [RICO's] purposes, the narrow readings offered by the
dissenters and the court below would in effect eliminate § 1964(c) from the statute." Id. at 498.
"We do not believe that the amorphous standing requirement ["racketeering injury"] imposed by
the Second Circuit effectively responds to [the problems of RICO evolving into something quite
different than originally conceived and the "extraordinary" uses to which RICO was being put],
or that it is a form of statutory amendment appropriately undertaken by the courts." Id. at 500.
63. Id. at 498 (quotation omitted).
64. See id. at 499-500 (noting that flaws in RICO statute must be corrected by Congress).
On this point, the Sedima Court stated:
It is true that private civil actions under the statute are being brought solely against
[private] defendants rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster. Yet
this defect - if defect it is - is inherent in the statute as writ ten, and its correction
lies with Congress. It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situ-
ations where Congress has provided it simply because plaintiffs are not taking ad-
vantage of it in its more difficult applications.
Id.
65. See Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The action of
[the defendants] comprised one continuing scheme to convert gas from [plaintiff's] pipeline ....
(T]he record reveals one isolated fraudulent scheme .... It places a real strain on the language
[of RICO] to speak of a single fraudulent effort, implemented by several fraudulent acts as a
'pattern of racketeering activity.'") (citation omitted); see also H.J., Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co.,
829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987) ("In order to demonstrate the necessary continuity appellants
must allege that Northwestern Bell 'had engaged in similar endeavors in the past or that [it was]
engaged in other criminal activities.' A single fraudulent effort or scheme is insufficient."
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)), rev'd and remanded, 492 U.S. 229 (1989). The
Eighth Circuit clung to the "multiple scheme" requirement despite overwhelming rejection of
the requirement in other circuits. See H.J., Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 235 n.2
(1989) (citing cases from other circuits rejecting multiple scheme requirements).
To understand the fault in the Eighth Circuit approach, assume that an employee embez-
zles $10,000 a month from his employer for ten years. Under the Eighth Circuit view, the
employee would be immune from RICO's provisions because there was only one "scheme" to
defraud.
66. 492 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1989) (rejecting Eighth Circuit's multiple scheme test). The
Court said:
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found other artificial ways to impose a heightened pattern requirement."
These decisions were merely symptoms of a broader judicial assault on
civil RICO, as courts imposed jurisdictional limitations,s onerous pleading
requirements,69 and other procedural obstacles designed to curtail civil RICO
litigation.7 ° Furthermore, even when fraud victims could overcome these bar-
riers, they faced other judicially imposed restrictions that effectively conferred
immunity from civil RICO liability upon perpetrators of massive white-collar
frauds.
71
Although these restrictions have caused civil RICO litigation to decline,
the statute remains the preferred remedy for victims of large-scale frauds.
Absent a treble damages remedy, fraud victims often have little hope of recov-
ering their actual losses.7' RICO's continued viability, however, is now
threatened by circuit court cases reading a reliance requirement into the sta-
tute. Typically, these decisions have misconstrued the Supreme Court's
decision in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. ,7 which did not
[Alithough proof that a RICO defendant has been involved in multiple criminal
schemes would certainly be highly relevant to the inquiry into the continuity of the
defendant's racketeering activity, it is implausible to suppose that Congress thought
continuity might be shown only by proof of multiple schemes. The Eighth Circuit's test
brings a rigidity to the available methods of proving a pattern that simply is not present
in the idea of "continuity" itself, and it does so, moreover, by introducing a concept -
the "scheme" - that appears nowhere in the language or legislative history of the Act.
H.J., Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,240-41 (1989). The Supreme Court also noted
that a vast majority of the other circuits had rejected the multiple scheme requirement. See id.
at 235 n.2 (citing cases from all other circuits except Eighth that had rejected multiple scheme
requirement).
The multiple scheme requirement contains the same deficiency that a reliance requirement
contains. A reliance requirement brings a rigidity not justified by RICO's language. Demon-
strating victim reliance should not be the only way to prove proximate cause. For an in-depth
discussion of the "continuity" and "pattern" concepts as they apply to RICO, see generally Gold-
smith, supra note 28.
67. See Goldsmith, supra note 46, at 20-22 ("[Mjany judges force absurd results by
imposing an overly restrictive standard for what constitutes pattern. Thus, courts have arbi-
trarily rejected pattern claims on [a variety of] grounds."). Some examples of these require-
ments are racketeering activity lasting less than a year, requiring racketeering activity to "con-
stitute a regular part of the defendant's business," requiring the activity to cease before suit, and
requiring multiple victims, among others. See id. at 21-22 nn.1 16-22 (citing cases so holding).
68. See id. at 19 nn.108-09 (discussing standing limitations and "filed rate" doctrine).
69. See id. at 19 n. 111 (discussing application in RICO suits of federal requirement that
plaintiff plead fraud with particularity).
70. See id. at 19-20 nn. 112-13 (discussing denial of standing and equitable relief).
71. See id. at 2-3, 20-22 (detailing various ways in which courts have judicially restricted
civil RICO's reach).
72. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that pre-RICO remedies afforded
minimal relief).
73. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
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address the reliance issue and simply required RICO plaintiffs to prove factual
and proximate causation."4
IV Holmes v. SIPC: The Causation Standard for Civil RICO
InHolmes, Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) alleged that
the defendant "conspired in a stock-manipulation scheme that disabled two
broker-dealers from meeting obligations to customers, thus triggering SIPC's
statutory duty to advance funds to reimburse the customers.""5 SIPC sued
under RICO to recover these funds, although SIPC had neither sold nor pur-
chased securities in reliance on Holmes' alleged stock manipulation scheme.76
The district court rejected SIPC's claim against Holmes because SIPC failed
to meet the "'purchaser-seller' requirements for standing to assert RICO claims
that are predicated upon violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5)"" and
failed to prove proximate cause.7" The Ninth Circuit rejected both grounds for
the trial court's decision, ruling the district court's "finding of no proximate
cause to be error." '79 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the narrow issue
of whether SIPC had standing to sue under RICO, despite being neither a
purchaser nor a seller of securities.8" The Supreme Court reversed."'
74. See Holmes v. See. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-77 (1992) (discussing
rationales for requiring plaintiff to show proximate cause in addition to actual cause).
75. Id. at 261. Apparently Holmes and other dealers conspired to manipulate certain
stocks. Part of the scheme was creating the appearance of a liquid market for the stocks by
buying and selling substantial amounts of the stocks with the traders' own funds and making
overly optimistic statements about the companies' futures. When the fraud was uncovered, the
dealers were forced to liquidate their shares of the stocks at heavily reduced prices. This made
it impossible for the broker-dealers to meet obligations to their customers. S[PC liquidated the
broker-dealers and advanced nearly $13 million to cover the broker-dealer's customers' claims.
See id. at 262-63 (describing specific allegations).
76. See id. at 261 (describing general allegations and theory of recovery).
77. Id. at 264 (quotation omitted). Instead, SIPC based its right to recovery on the com-
mon law principle of subrogation. See id. at 270 (discussing subrogation theory).
78. Id. at 263-64.
79. Id. at 264. The Ninth Circuit held that, under § 1964(c) of RICO, SIPC was not
required to be either a purchaser or seller of securities, unlike the requirements for standing in
a civil suit based on section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. The Ninth Circuit also
held that the district court erroneously focused on the causal relationship between Holmes's acts
and SIPC's injury rather than attributing all of the conspirators' acts to Holmes and evaluating
proximate causation considering all of the conspirators' acts. Id. While the petition for certiorari
addressed two issues - SIPC's standing to sue under RICO and whether Holmes was responsible
for his fellow conspirators' acts - the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the standing issue
alone. Id. at 264-65.
80. Id. at 264-65.
81. Id. at 265.
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The Court initially observed that 18 U.S.C. § 1964 requires RICO victims
to prove factual causation."2 In effect, plaintiffs must prove that "but for" the
alleged racketeering violation, they would not have been injured in their
business or property. 3 The Court also stressed, however, that "but for" causa-
tion, standing alone, is not sufficient to recover under RICO: 4
[The] language [of § 1964] can, of course, be read to mean that a plaintiff
is injured "by reason of' a RICO violation, and therefore may recover,
simply on showing that the defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was
injured, and the defendant's violation was a "but for" cause of plaintiff's
injury. This construction is hardly compelled, however, and the very
unlikelihood that Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs
to recover persuades us that RICO should not get such an expansive read-
ing. Not even SIPC seriously argues otherwise.85
Noting that "[t]he Courts of Appeals have overwhelmingly held that not
mere factual, but proximate causation is required,"8 6 the Court concluded that
"[p]roximate cause is thus required.""
A. Public Policy and Proximate Causation: The Holmes
Tripartite Analysis
Justice Souter's majority opinion advanced at least three policy reasons
for finding that civil RICO requires proximate cause. "First, the less direct an
injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's
damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other factors."88 Absent
a proximate cause requirement, courts would have difficulty distinguishing
between damages resulting from defendants' conduct and those caused by
other, possibly unrelated, factors.
82. See id. ("[A]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue thereafter in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reason-
able attorney fee." (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000))).
83. See id. at 265-66 (noting that provision could be read to require only "but for" causa-
tion).
84. See id. at 266 n.10 (noting that "[iln a philosophical sense, the consequences of an
act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and
beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite
liability for all wrongful acts... ." (quotations omitted)).
85. Id. at 265-66 (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
86. Id.at266n.11.
87. Id. at 268.
88. Id. at 269. One of the reasons the Court rejected SIPC's claims was the difficulty of
determining whether the amount that SIPC was required to pay resulted from the manipulation
of the stocks of the various companies and what portion of the payments resulted from the
"broker-dealers' poor business practices or their failures to anticipate developments in the finan-
cial markets." Id. at 272-73.
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Second, "recognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts
to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed
at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of mul-
tiple recoveries." 9 The Court indicated that this was a distinct consideration
from the factual causation inquiry.' ° A proximate cause requirement removes
that need.
Third, the Court concluded that any benefit derived from allowing more
remote parties;to sue did not justify the increased difficulties of permitting
these parties access to RICO. "mhe need to grapple with these problems is
simply unjustified by the general interest in deterring injurious conduct, since
directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as
private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by
plaintiffs injured more remotely."91  The Court specifically noted that an
alternative plaintiff- the broker-dealers - already had sued to vindicate RICO's
concerns.' Given these public policy concerns, the Court instructed that prox-
imate causation must be determined according to common law principles.93
B. Determining Proximate Causation Under the Common Law
Based on its common law origins, the Court categorized proximate cause
as a generic label for "the judicial tools used to limit a person's responsibility
for the consequences of that person's own acts."'94 Among other factors, the
89. Id. at 269. "Assuming that an appropriate assessment of factual causation could be
made out, the district court would then have to find some way to apportion the possible respec-
tive recoveries by the broker-dealers and the customers, who would otherwise each be entitled
to recover the full treble damages." Id. at 273.
90. See id. at 269 (characterizing any apportionment of damages as "quite apart from
problems of proving factual causation").
91. Id. at 269-70. "[T]he law would be shouldering these difficulties [determining factual
causation and apportioning damages] despite the fact that those directly injured, the broker-
dealers, could be counted on to bring suit for the law's vindication." Id. at 273. The Court
noted that in fact the broker-dealers had brought suit through the SIPC trustees. Id.
92. Id. at 273.
93. See id. at 268 ("Here we use 'proximate cause' to label generically the judicial tools
used to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts."). The
Holmes Court also noted the parallel between anti-trust and RICO and remarked that the anti-
trust proximate cause inquiry "incorporate[d] common-law proximate causation." Id. at 267.
94. Id. at 268. Some examples of common law tools employed to limit a defendant's
liability under a proximate cause analysis are determining whether a direct injury has been
established, determining whether the defendant's actions were a substantial cause of the plain-
tifi's injuries, and determining the foreseeability of the plaintiff's injuries. See Ganim v. Smith
& Wesson Corp., No. CU9901531985, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3330, at *25-*32 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1999) (identifying several common law limitations used to determine proximate cause
and applying Holmes to claim by city of Bridgeport, Connecticut against gun manufactures),
affd, 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001).
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common law generally demanded "some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged." ' The majority opinion explained
that the term "direct" was "a reference to the proximate-cause inquiry that is
informed by the [tripartite] concerns set out in the [Holmes opinion itself]."'
Thus, Holmes's tripartite analysis sets the context in which a court must
consider the "direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged."97 For example, plaintiffs "complain[ing] of harm flowing
merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant's
acts [are] generally said to stand at too remote a distance to recover.""
The Court expressly refrained from establishing a definite test for proxi-
mate causation." On the contrary, Justice Souter acknowledged that "the
infinite variety of claims that may arise make it virtually impossible to an-
nounce a black letter rule that will dictate the result in every case."'"° The
Court thereby expected lower courts to resolve proximate cause inquiries on
a case-by-case basis rather than resort to rigidly restrictive rules.101 Accord-
ingly, though proof of reliance obviously establishes proximate cause under
RICO, nothing in Holmes suggests that such proof is the only way to do so."°2
Holmes expressly declined to address the reliance issue. Rather, the
Court qualified its use of the term "direct" as follows: "We do not necessarily
use [the term 'direct'] in the same sense as courts before us have and intimate
no opinion on results they reached."'0° As such, the Court specifically refused
to endorse the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of the term in Pelletier v.
Zweifel,"°4 which held that a RICO plaintiff alleging mail fraud "must have
been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment
on misrepresentations made in furtherance of the scheme."'1
05
95. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 368 (1992).
96. Id. at 274 n.20.
97. Id. at 268. In explaining the proximate cause requirement, the Court stated that
"among the many shapes this concept took at common law, was a demand for some direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 268-69.
99. See infra part VIA (discussing reasons proximate cause is not susceptible to definite
test).
100. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 274 n.20 (emphasis added).
101. Courts perform proximate cause analysis on a case-by-case basis, probably daily, in
the run-of-the-mill tort claim. Thus, a case-by-case analysis is clearly workable.
102. See Qenco, supra note 5, at 373. "Justifiable reliance may, of course, establish prox-
imate cause, but it is not invariably required to prove it. Reliance is a sufficient, but not a
necessary cause." Id. (emphasis in original).
103. Holmes v. See. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274 n.20 (1992).
104. 921 F.2d 1465 (11 th Cir. 1991).
105. Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11 th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
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Since Holmes, however, several circuits have improperly engrafted a
reliance requirement onto RICO by finding it to be a prerequisite to proximate
causation."ce These courts have ignored the expansive evolution of fraud
106. See infra Part V (discussing various circuit courts' approaches to proximate causation
reliance requirement). Indeed, several recent appellate decisions potentially render the reliance
requirement in RICO litigation an insuperable barrier to class certification involving allegations
of widespread fraud. See Johnson v. HBO Film Mgmt., 265 F.3d 178, 185-94 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that need for individual reliance determinations precludes class certification); Patterson
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 241 F.3d 417,419 (5th Cir. 2001) (same); Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
231 F.3d 970, 978-79 (5th Cir. 2000) (same). These cases demonstrate the devastating impact
of improperly reading reliance into RICO. Interestingly, a recent Seventh Circuit decision
upholding equity relief under RICO promises an alternative route to obtain class-wide justice in
large scale RICO cognizable frauds. See N.O.W., Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2000).
Scheidler adopts the view that the RICO's civil remedy section's (§ 1964) plain language
entitles private plaintiffs to seek equitable relief. Id. at 697-98. In so doing, Scheidler properly
rejects the Ninth Circuit's decision in Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d
1076 (9th Cir. 1986), which "relied almost exclusively on the legislative history of RICO to
reach its result, as opposed to the actual language of the statute." Scheidler, 267 F.3d at 695; see,
e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson, Predators Rights: Multiple Remediesfor Wall Street Sharks Under the
Securities Law and RICO, 10 J. CORP. L. 3, 63-76 (1984) (arguing that RICO's civil remedies
statute intended to permit plaintiffs to pursue equitable relief).
Through the equitable disgorgement remedy, Scheidler potentially promises to provide
fraud victims relief when reliance would otherwise wrongly constitute a barrier to recovery.
Various federal statutes provide for the equitable remedy of disgorgement as a useful sanction.
"[flt is simple equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his fraudulent enrichment." Janigan v.
Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965) (securities); see also FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87
F.3d 466, 469 (11 th Cir. 1996) (trade practices) ("Among the equitable powers of a court is the
power to grant restitution and disgorgement."); SEC v. AMX, Int'l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 76 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1993) (securities) ("[A] disgorgement order is considered to be in the form of a continuing
injunction in the public interest.").
In Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), the Supreme Court affirmed that
a district court, properly asserting equity jurisdiction, may impose any equitable remedy,
including disgorgement. Id. at 398-99. Disgorgement is properly available to RICO plaintiffs.
See, e.g., United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n. of Nassau/Suffolk, 44 F.3d 1082,
1084 (2d Cir. 1994). In this context, the RICO reliance element would have no application, as
standing and proximate cause principles operate quite differently in an equitable context. See
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n.6 (1986) (distinguishing between
standing requirements for equitable and damages relief).
Once a class plaintiff exercises the option to only seek equitable relief - i.e., not
damages - the rationale for requiring reliance to distinguish direct from indirect or remote
claimants wholly disappears. See Summit Props., Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 214 F.3d
556, 560-61 (5th Cir. 2000) (using reliance as proxy for direct/indirect distinction). In contrast
to treble-damages actions, class action claims for equitable relief present no risk of duplicative
recoveries or complex allocation problems because the very individuals entitled to relief would
constitute the class bringing suit. McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir.
1996) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring antitrust damages action but were not
barred from seeking equitable relief). Finally, if reliance is not implicated in granting equitable
relief to a class, the per se predominance rule of decisions like Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
241 F.3d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 2001), orBolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 978 (5th
Cir. 2000), is not implicated.
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legislation and have adopted precisely the formalistic approach to proximate
cause that Holmes eschewed. °7
V The Rift over Reliance: RICO and Proximate Cause in the
Circuit Courts
The appellate courts' failure consistently to abide by Holmes has pro-
duced a confusing array of circuit conflicts. These conflicts have spurred
forum shopping because the proximate cause-reliance issue thereby turns on
the circuit in which a case has been filed. Even forum shopping, however, has
been rendered problematic by the circuits' inability to articulate and enforce
internally consistent proximate cause standards. For example, at least four
lines of circuit authority have emerged: (1) circuits implying that reliance is
not a prerequisite to proximate cause; s (2) circuits implying that reliance is
essential to proximate cause; ° (3) circuits expressly holding that reliance is
required for proximate cause;"' and (4) circuits internally conflicted over this
issue."' Before the reliance-proximate cause issue can be resolved, however,
the different circuit perspectives must be understood." 2
A. Non-Reliance Implied
Two Ninth Circuit cases taken together imply that reliance is not a
prerequisite to proximate cause under RICO." 3 In Wilcox v. First Interstate
Bank of Oregon,"' the Ninth Circuit rejected a defendant's argument that an
adverse jury verdict on a common law fraud claim precluded RICO litigation
107. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9 (discussing Congress's and Supreme Court's
rationale for rejecting reliance requirement); see also Genco, supra note 5, at 356 ("[B]ecause
the drafters [of the mail fraud statute] omitted both misrepresentation and reliance, neither
should be invariably required. Accordingly mail fraud is best seen as a modem form of com-
mon law cheat [which did not require reliance].").
108. The Ninth Circuit has implied that reliance is not a required element of a civil RICO
claim. See infra Part VA (discussing Ninth Circuit cases).
109. The First Circuit has implied that reliance is a required element of a civil RICO claim.
See infra Part V.B (discussing First Circuit cases).
110. The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits fall into this category. See infra Part V.C
(discussing Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuit cases).
111. The Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits are all internally conflicted as to a reli-
ance requirement in civil RICO. See infra Part V.D (citing Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuit cases and discussing Fifth Circuit cases as examples).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9 (discussing Congress's and Supreme Court's
rationales for rejecting reliance requirement).
113. See Or. Laborers-Employees Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185
F.3d 957, 963-66 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying Holmes tripartite analysis); Wilcox v. First Interstate
Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522,528-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting plaintiff's RICO claims).
114. 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987).
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based on the same underlying facts."' Among-other things, the court reasoned
that "the elements necessary to support damages under RICO are different
from... common law fraud." '116 Wilcox implies that RICO does not require
reliance as reliance is an element of common law fraud. However, because
proximate cause was not at issue in Wilcox, the Ninth Circuit had no occasion
to consider whether RICO required reliance.117 In Oregon Laborers-Employ-
ers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,"' the Ninth Circuit
subsequently reinforced the implication that RICO contains no reliance
requirement, as the court engaged in a comprehensive, Holmes-based proxi-
mate cause analysis without even mentioning reliance. 19
B. Reliance Implied
In contrast, the First Circuit has implied that reliance is essential to prove
proximate cause under RICO. In Efron v. Embassy Suites (Puerto Rico),
Inc.,2 the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint for fail-
ure to plead a pattern of racketeering activity.' The court observed in dicta
that "lack of causation seems to be a significant possibility [in this case].
Efron entered the... [transaction] without reliance on any misrepresenta-
115. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 531-32 (rejecting defendant's argument because RICO requires
lower standard of proof than does common law fraud). The plaintiffs alleged that they negoti-
ated business loans from a bank. Id. at 524. The variable interest rates depended on the prime
rate as determined by the bank plus a risk factor. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the bank had
conspired with its subsidiary banks to fix the prime rate. Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs com-
plained that the bank had violated RICO by "using the mail to charge and collect excessive
interest based on deceptive overstatements of FIOR's [First Interstate Bank of Oregon's] true
prime rate." Id.
116. Id. at 531 n.7 (noting that Fifth Ciruit so held in Armco Industrial Credit Corp. v.
SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475,482 (5th Cir. 1986)).
117. See id. at 529-32 (discussing only enterprise injury, distinction between person and
enterprise, and collateral estoppel issues).
118. 185 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999).
119. See Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185
F.3d 957, 963-66 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing Holmes-based proximate cause analysis); see also
infra Part VI.D (detailing Holmes-based proximate cause analysis).
120. 223 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2000).
121. See Efron v. Embassy Suites (P.R.), Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 13 (Ist Cir. 2000) (giving
disposition), cert denied, 121 S. Ct 1228 (2001). The plaintiff alleged that Embassy Suites
Puerto Rico "purposefully created artificial cash shortfalls, which under the Partnership
agreement [with the plaintiff] could be covered by capital calls to the limited partners." Id. at
14. The agreement stated that a partner's refusal to contribute additional capital would result
in a proportionate reduction in that partner's ownership interest. Id. Thus, Efron claimed that
the defendants forced him to invest another $1 million in the hotel venture by multiple capital
calls that threatened his initial investment. Id. He alleged violations of RICO based on
predicate acts of mail fraud and RICO conspiracy. Id.
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tions."'2 2  Given this "seeming weakness" in the plaintiff's RICO claim, 123
Efron certainly suggests that the First Circuit would disregard Holmes's tri-
partite proximate cause analysis and read a reliance requirement into RICO.
C. Reliance Clearly Required
Three circuits have expressly required a showing of reliance to establish
proximate cause under civil RICO.124 Indeed, the Second Circuit has repeat-
edly held that RICO mail fraud claims require proof of reliance.121 In County
of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co.,126 the court reasoned that because
"persons injured 'by reason of' a RICO violation may maintain a civil RICO
clain[,]. . . '[t]he phrase "by reason of' requires that there be a causal con-
nection between the prohibited conduct and plaintiff's injury.""d27 The court
concluded that, in civil RICO mail fraud cases, causation requires a showing
of reliance on the alleged misrepresentations."2 Long Island Lighting Co.
preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes, which declined to impose
a definitive direct injury test for proximate cause determinations, but the
Second Circuit took this same approach post-Holmes in Metromedia Co. v.
Fugazy.'29 The Fugazy court stated that "in the context of an alleged RICO
predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required con-
nection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrep-
resentations were relied on.'
130
122. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). The court noted that Efron did not "allege that he was
deceived by the written requests for additional capital. Instead, he describes his 'injury-in-fact'
as the prospect of a squeezed-down equity position in the partnership .... " Id. The court further
indicated that this loss resulted from the plaintiff's failure to contribute all of the necessary funds,
but was "not necessarily a loss occasioned by misrepresentations or false assurances." Id.
123. Id. The Efron court did not decide that case on grounds of causation, partly because
the parties largely ignored the issue. Id. Nevertheless, the court noted that an inference of reli-
ance by Efron was possible only under an "extremely generous reading" of the complaint. Id.
124. See, e.g., Chisolm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d 331,337 (4th Cir. 1996) (review-
ing circuit case law on reliance requirement); Cent. Distrib. of Beer, Inc. v. Conn, 5 F.3d 181,
184 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295,
1311 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that causation requirement necessitates reliance requirement).
125. See Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that
plaintiffs must allege that misrepresentations caused them to invest and lose funds); Metromedia
Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir. 1992) (reiterating that Second Circuit requires
reliance); Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d at 1311 (finding reliance requirement).
126. 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
127. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1311 (2d Cir. 1992)
(quoting Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 636 (2d Cir. 1989)).
128. Id.
129. 983 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1992).
130. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Long Island
Lighting Co., 907 F.2d at 1311).
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The Fourth"' and Sixth'32 Circuits have employed similar reasoning in
requiring civil RICO plaintiffs to demonstrate reliance. For example, in
Brandenburg v. Seidel,'33 the Fourth Circuit stated,
The defendants correctly point out that while... it is not necessary to
establish detrimental reliance by the victim in orderto make out a violation
of the federal mail statute, such reliance is necessary to establish injury to
business or property "by reason of' a predicate act of mail fraud within the
meaning.of § 1964(c)."M
The Fourth Circuit's subsequent decisions consistently have implemented
similar reasoning without regard to Holmes's tripartite analysis. 3 '
131. See Chisolm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1996) ("The only
caveat is that, where fraud is alleged as a proximate cause of injury, the fraud must be a 'classic'
one. In other words, the plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defen-
dant's material misrepresentation."); Mid At. Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Serv., Inc., 18
F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting but not ruling on defense argument that "absent reliance,
Mid Atlantic could not bring a RICO claim under § 1964(c)"); Caviness v. Derand Res. Corp.,
983 F.2d 1295, 1305 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Even looking beyond the allegations of the complaint
to the record, we can discover no evidence of reliaice or damage."); Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d
1006, 1011 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing rule from Brandenburg); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d
1179, 1188 n.10 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that reliance is needed to establish injury by reason of
predicate act of RICO mail fraud).
132. See Cent. Distrib. of Beer, Inc. v. Conn, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir. 1993) (reiterating
reliance requirement); Brightman v. Freeway Ass'n., No. 90-4072, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
19069, at *8 (6th Cir. 1991) (reiterating that Sixth Circuit requires RICO plaintiffs to plead with
particularity facts showing reliance); Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. Am. Safety Prods., Inc., 831
F.2d 596, 606 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[The plaintiffs] pleadings and proof at trial demonstrate that
it was in no way deceived by [the defendant's] mailings, and in no way relied on those letters
to its detriment." (citation omitted)); Blount Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 819
F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Fraud alleged in a RICO civil complaint must state with
particularity the false statement of fact made by the defendant which the plaintiff relied on and
the facts showing the plaintiff's reliance on defendant's false statement of fact."); Bender v.
Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Second, the plaintiffs' complaint does
not allege what misrepresentations (or omissions) of material fact [the defendant] made to the
plaintiffs that they reasonably relied on to their detriment. Hence, the plaintiffs have inade-
quately alleged the requisite elements of mail fraud." (citation omitted)).
The Sixth Circuit reasoning in CentralDistributors ofBeer, Inc. v. Conn, 5 F.3d 181 (6th
Cir. 1993), is illustrative. In Conn, the court stated, "Central Distributors cannot maintain a
civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepre-
sentations or omissions of material fact to Central Distributors and evidence that Central
Distributors relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment." Conn, 5 F.3d
at 184 (emphasis added). Applying this rule, the court concluded, "Central Distributors has not
produced a shred of evidence showing that any of the defendants made any false statements or
omissions to Central Distributors or that Central Distributors relied on any statement or
omission to its detriment" Id.
133. 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988).
134. Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1188 n.10 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
135. See supra note 131 (reviewing Fourth Circuit cases).
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D. Intra-Circuit Confusion
Four Circuits have issued internally contradictory reliance rulings: the
Third,136 Fifth,137 Eighth,138 and Eleventh Circuits. 139 On different occasions,
each held that RICO both requires and does not require reliance to establish
proximate cause." The Fifth Circuit's contradictory reliance rulings illustrate
the resulting confusion and its consequences. In four decisions addressing
RICO proximate cause, the Fifth Circuit has ruled: (1) that reliance is not a
136. See Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 746 (3d Cir. 1996)
(affirming dismissal of RICO fraud claims, stating that plaintiff "cannot now claim that it
detrimentally relied on [the defendant's] intentional misrepresentations because Ideal knew it
was being overcharged for purchases almost from the start," from which one could infer that
reliance was required under that Court's interpretation of RICO). But see Tabas v. Tabas, 47
F.3d 1280, 1295 n.18 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Defendants' assertion that the mailings involved must
themselves be relied upon by the victim of the fraud in order for a RICO claim to be established
is inaccurate."); Envtl. Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1067 (3d Cir. 1988)
("To have standing to assert a civil RICO claim, [the plaintiff] need only allege an injury to its
business or property resulting from some or all of the predicate acts that comprise the RICO
violation.") (citation omitted), ard on other grounds, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
137. See infra notes 141-51 and accompanying text (analyzing Fifth Circuit rulings).
138. See United Healthcare Corp. v. Am. Trade Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 563, 571 n.5 (8th Cir.
1996) ("lIt is well settled that such a showing [detrimental reliance] is not required to prove
mail or wire fraud." (citations omitted)); Murr Plumbing, Inc. v. Scherer Bros. Fin. Seres., 48
F.3d 1066, 1609 (8th Cir. 1995) ("It follows that a RICO claim based upon the predicate acts
of mail or wire fraud does not require an allegation of misrepresentation or common law fraud."
(citation omitted)); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting reliance requirement because RICO mail fraud's reach "is broader than the concept
of common-law fraud under Minnesota law"). But see Appletee Square I, L.P. v. W.R. Grace
& Co., 29 F.3d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir. 1994) ("In order to establish injury to business or property
'by reason of' a predicate act of mail or wire fraud, a plaintiff must establish detrimental reli-
ance on the alleged fraudulent acts." (citations omitted)); Flowers v. Cont'l Grain Co., 775 F.2d
1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal because "there is no clear allegation that plain-
tiff has parted with property because of his reliance on representations made by the defendants
that they knew were false").
139. See All Care Nursing Serv. v. High Tech Staffing Sers., Inc., 135 F.3d 740, 745 n. 10
(11th Cir. 1998) ("Reliance is only an element of a RICO claim to the extent that a RICO
plaintiff must prove he was injured by reason of the RICO defendant's deception and fraud."
(citation omitted)). But see Turner v. Beneficial Corp., 236 F.3d 643, 650 (1 1th Cir. 2000)
("Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not enr in finding that reliance is an ele-
ment of a RICO claim and in denying class certification on that basis."), vacated by 242 F.3d
1023 (11th Cit. 2001); Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d 1090, 1097 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Because [the
plaintiff] did not rely to his detriment on the alleged misrepresentations, these misrepresenta-
tions are not the proximate cause of Beck's injury." (citation omitted)), af'd on other grounds,
524 U.S. 494 (2000); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465,1499-1500 (1 th Cir. 1991) ("[W]hen
the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plaintiff must have been a target of the
scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in further-
ance of that scheme." (citations omitted)).
140. See supra notes 136-39 (listing contradictory reliance rulings).
PROXIMATE CA USE IN CIVIL RACKETEERING CASES
requirement of proximate cause, 4 ' (2) that reliance is a sufficient but not
necessary condition for proximate cause,'42 (3) by implication, that reliance is
a requirement,'43 and (4) that reliance is a requirement of proximate cause.'"
In sum, the Fifth Circuit's range of reliance rulings encompass virtually
every conceivable outcome without arriving at a definitive standard. In the
process, the court has rendered stare decisis a nullity, with each new decision
pretending to write on a clean slate. For example, inArmco Industrial Credit
Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 4 the Fifth Circuit initially rejected a proposed
reliance jury instruction, reasoning that under the mail/fraud statute, "[ilt is
not necessary that the victim have detrimentally relied on the mailed misrepre-
sentations. Indeed, the intended victim need not even have been defrauded for
liability to attach under the mail fraud statute.' '146 However, in Summit Prop-
erties, Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.,'4 the Fifth Circuit recently stated that
"when civil RICO damages are sought for injuries resulting from fraud, a
general requirement of reliance by the plaintiff is a commonsense liability
limitation ... [that] is determinative in this case.'1
48
141. See Armo Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 481-82 (5th
Cir. 1986) ("To find a violation of the mail fraud statute it is not necessary that the victim have
detrimentally relied on the mail misrepresentations. Indeed, the intended victim need not even
have been defrauded for liability to attach under the mail fraud statute." (citations omitted)).
142. See Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Sys., Inc., 130 F.3d 143, 148-49 (5th Cir.
1997) (stating that "[p]roximate cause determination for RICO standing is guided by indications
of preconceived purpose, specifically intended consequence, necessary or natural result, reason-
able foreseeability of result, the intervention of independent causes, whether the defendant's
acts are a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation, and the factual directness
of the casual connection"), vacated as moot sub nom., Tel v. Khurana, 525 U.S. 979 (1998).
143. See Anderson v. Kutak, Rock, & Campbell, 51 F.3d 518, 523 (5th Cir. 1995) ("In
contrast [to the case cited by plaintiffs], there is no allegation in the instant case that [the plain-
tiffs] acted in any way in reliance upon a representation by the defendants that the bond pro-
ceeds would be used to finance low interest agricultural loans.").
144. See Summit Props., Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 214 F.3d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 2000)
("In sum, when civil RICO damages are sought for injuries resulting from fraud, a general
requirement of reliance by the plaintiff is a commonsense liability limitation."), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1132 (2001).
145. 782 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1986).
146. Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 481-82 (5th Cir.
1986).
147. 214 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2000).
148. Summit Props., Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 214 F.3d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 2000).
In so holding, the Fifth Circuit eviscerated any opportunity for recovery under RICO based on
predicate acts that do not require reliance and completely ignored the intended scope of the
"scheme to defraud" language in RICO itself. See supra notes 3-20 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing "scheme to defraud" language). The Summit court allowed for the possibility of RICO
standing, in third party transactions in which "plaintiffhas... been the target of a fraud." Sum-
mit, 214 F.2d at 561. However, its parsimonious application of the "target area" for standing
purposes effectively re-introduced the reliance element. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
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Remarkably, the Summit court concluded that "Armco does not answer
the question before us: whether reliance is necessary to establish proximate
cause under RICO."149 The Fifth Circuit did not attempt to reconcile this
observation with decisions rendered elsewhere that interpreted Armco as
rejecting a reliance requirement. 5 ' Furthermore, Summit barely mentioned
the Holmes decision and did not attempt to apply its tripartite analysis to the
plaintiffs' claims.' Not only did Summit fail to follow the law of its own
circuit, it also failed to follow Supreme Court precedent.
VI. A Balanced Approach as Required by Holmes
The rift over reliance stems from the judiciary's failure to abide by
Holmes. Rather than apply the functional tripartite analysis Holmes articu-
lated for proximate cause determinations, 2 numerous courts have imposed
a threshold reliance requirement for proximate cause.' 53 In the course of
creating widespread circuit conflicts, these decisions overlook a century of
mail fraud jurisprudence, which recognized that the statutory prohibition
against "schemes to defraud"'5 4 encompasses many complex frauds capable
of implementation without victim reliance. 5 Cases such as Summit thereby
specifically rejected the "target area" label. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.
State Council of Carpenters., 459 U.S. 519, 536 n.33 (1983).
149. Summit, 214 F.3d at 559.
150. See Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 531 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Similarly, in Armco, the Fifth Circuit held that the elements necessary to support damages
under civil RICO are different from state causes of action, including common law fraud. The
difference is that 'justifiable reliance is not an element that need be proven to establish a mail
fraud violation." (quoting Armco, 782 F.2d at 482) (emphasis added)); Sys. Mgmt., Inc. v.
Loiselle, 112 F. Supp. 2d 112, 114 (D. Mass. 2000) (citing Armco as rejecting reliance require-
ment); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 828 F. Supp. 287, 295 (D.N.J. 1993)
(same); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 926, 946-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(same); Omega Constr. Co. v. Altman, 667 F. Supp. 453,462 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (citing Armco
for rule that RICO plaintiffs need not show that they actually were defrauded).
151. See Summit Props. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 214 F.3d 556, 559-60 (5th Cir. 2000)
(showing that court did not follow Holmes directive, but merely limited itself to declaring,
"[T]he Supreme Court in Holmes [has] explicitly adopted a traditional proximate causation
requirement" (citation omitted)).
152. See supra Part IVA (detailing tripartite system). The Holmes Court indicated that
denying recovery to indirect parties was justified by the following three policy concerns: the dif-
ficulty of assigning liability among various tortfeasors other than the RICO defendant, the risk
of double recovery, and the existence of other parties likely to enforce RICO's civil provisions.
See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,269-70 (1992) (giving policy concerns).
153. See supra notes 120-51 and accompanying text (reviewing reliance holdings).
154. See supra notes 2-20 and accompanying text (noting that violations of mail and wire
fraud statutes do not require victim reliance).
155. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text (listing frauds). Examples include
bribery, embezzlement, check kiting, and money laundering. Id.
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have read the term "scheme to defraud" out of the mail and wire fraud statutes
for civil racketeering cases." 6 The resulting statutory anomaly is inconsistent
with both public policy and common law doctrine.
A. RICO Public Policy and Common Law Doctrine
From a public policy standpoint, RICO seeks to foster private enforce-
ment actions by providing incentives for civil litigation that are identical to
those of its antitrust antecedent.5 7 Thus, the Holmes Court viewed proximate
cause as an avenue for identifying the private party best situated to effectuate
civil RICO's enforcement function. 5' In contrast, a proximate cause test
based exclusively on victim reliance threatens to defeat this goal in some
cases by precluding all victims from initiating RICO enforcement actions. 59
156. See Summit, 214 F.3d at 562 (failing to recognize this fact by finding that "when civil
RICO damages are sought for injuries resulting from fraud, a general requirement of reliance
by plaintiff is a common sense liability limitation" (emphasis added)). This result is inconsistent
with RICO's purposes. The number and variety of acts that qualify as predicate acts under civil
RICO indicate that a threshold reliance requirement for determining proximate cause is simply
inappropriate. See H.J., Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248-49 (1989) ("Congress
drafted RICO broadly enough to encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking many
different forms and likely to attract a broad array of perpetrators operating in many different
ways."). Requiring reliance guarantees immunity to the significant portion of RICO violators
whose predicate acts do not require a misrepresentation.
157. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (reviewing impetus for these incentives).
Congress modeled RICO's civil remedies on those of the antitrust statutes. See Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1987) (noting that Clayton Act
provides "closest analogy to civil RICO"); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489
(1985) (referring to "Clayton Act model").
158. See Stasia Mosesso, Note, Up in Smoke: How the Proximate Cause Battle Extin-
guished the Tobacco War, 76 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 257,303 (2000) (outlining policy concerns
of Holmes). The author stated:
The final policy factor outlined in Holmes expressly identifies the concern about
multiple plaintiffs. The Court found that the best way to guard against the potential
for multiple claims was to suggest that the trial court inquire into whether a more
directly injured party was present who should bring the claim. The inquiry to
determine the best plaintiff should not be a method of precluding deserved recov-
ery. It should merely be an attempt to find the best plaintiff.
Id.
159. See id. at 321 (citing tobacco litigants as example). Mosesso criticized the Second
Circuit for failing to identify a better plaintiff than the health funds to pursue RICO claims
against the tobacco industry, saying:
The fact that the Second Circuit did not identify a better plaintiff is particularly
troublesome in the context of this RICO litigation. By denying standing to the
Funds, the court effectively immunized the tobacco industry from RICO claims,
since the individual smokers are barred from suit under RICO due to the restriction
that injury must be to "business or property."
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Nor can this outcome be justified by common law doctrine. At common
law, the term "proximate cause" had an uncertain meaning."sc Indeed, Prosser
and Keeton characterized proximate cause as "an unfortunate term"'61 that
"could not be reduced to absolute rules."' 62 For this reason, Holmes acknowl-
edged that the proximate cause inquiry was not an exact science. 63 In fact,
the common law employed several distinct inquiries to determine proximate
cause.' Examples include whether the injury was remote in time and place
Id. (citation omitted). While articulating a legitimate concern, this argument misses the mark
somewhat. RICO, by definition, is inapplicable to personal injury. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(2000) (requiring injury to "business or property"). Thus, smokers can enforce RICO only if
they can prove injury to business or property instead of personal injury. Nevertheless, Holmes
does not guarantee the existence of a RICO plaintiff in every case. Instead, Holmes focused on
the existence of potential plaintiffs likely to enforce civil RICO's provisions other than the
plaintiff involved in the litigation. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-
70 (1992) (stating that directly injured plaintiffs act as sufficient enforcement body without
resort to remote victims). However, a blanket reliance requirement creates situations in which
no satisfactory plaintiff exists to pursue a civil RICO claim. These situations are unwarranted
and defeat congressional intent. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Summit eliminated the only
party with motivation and standing to bring a civil RICO suit, despite the direct injuries the
defendant's actions caused the plaintiffs. See infra Part VI.C (examining Summit).
160. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41,at 263 (W. Page Keeton et al.
eds, 5th ed. 1984) (noting ambiguity surrounding proximate cause). Prosser and Keeton state:
This connection usually is dealt with by the courts in terms of what is called "proxi-
mate cause," or "legal cause." There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law
which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such
a welter of confusion. Nor, despite the manifold attempts which have been made to
clarify the subject, is there any general agreement as to the best approach. Much of
this confusion is due to the fact that no one problem is involved, but a number of
different problems, which are not distinguished clearly, and that language appropri-
ate to a discussion of one is carried over to cast a shadow upon the others.
Id. § 41, at 263-64.
161. Id.§41,at264.
162. Id. § 42, at 279. The Restatement (Second) of Torts eschews the term "proximate
cause," preferring to use "legal causation" instead. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431
(1965). Conduct is the legal cause of harm if it is "a 'substantial factor' in bringing about the
harm." Id. The Restatement approach rejects mechanical tests in favor of balancing multiple
considerations, including the number of other factors contributing to the harm, the extent that
the defendant's actions standing alone contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, whether the
defendant's actions set in motion a chain of events, and the lapse of time. Id. § 433.
163. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 n.20 (announcing black-letter role regarding directness and
noting that proximate cause would be "virtually impossible" (quoting Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983))).
164. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, § 42, at 276 ("The search for some test or
formula which will serve as a universal solvent for all of the problems of "proximate cause" has
occupied many writers.... [D]ozens of touchstones and panaceas... have been proposed.").
Some of these proposed touchstones include "nearest cause," "last human wrongdoer," "cause
and condition," "substantial-factor test," and "justly attachable cause." Id. § 42, at 276-79.
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("remoteness"), 65 whether a defendant's actions caused the alleged injury
directly or indirectly ("direct vs. indirect injury")," and whether a defen-
dant's actions constituted a substantial factor in producing a plaintiff's injury
("substantial factor").
167
In sum, rather than apply strict rules, proximate cause developed as a
policy-based principle aimed at limiting the "scope of liability... [reflecting]
Obviously, if the proximate cause inquiry under the common law could be resolved simply by
asking whether the plaintiff relied on the defendant's actions, the multitude of approaches that
common law judges used to determine proximate cause would have been unnecessary.
165. Id. § 42, at 276. The remoteness approach is also called "the nearest cause." See id.
(stating that "proximate" means near or nearest). At early common law, the result of the remote-
ness inquiry was that "only the antecedent which is nearest in time or space is regarded as the
legal cause, and none other will be held responsible." Id. Because of the harshness of this rule,
courts began to make exceptions. See id. (noting that courts have long ceased to recognize that
rule). However, the basic concept is still present: the further away in space and time from the
tortfeasor's acts the plaintiff's damages stand, the more likely it is that the damages resulted
from the acts of someone other than the tortfeasor.
166. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) ("Accordingly,
among the many shapes [proximate cause] took at common law was a demand for some direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged."). The thrust of the
inquiry is to identify an injury suffered directly by the plaintiff and depending solely on the
defendant's actions rather than an injury suffered by the plaintiff resulting from injuries third
parties sustained because of the defendant's acts. Id. at 268-69. In Holmes, the Court found
the plaintiff's injuries to be indirect because SIPC's obligations to indemnify investors de-
pended on brokers failing. Id. at 271. The defendants' fraudulent actions were but one of the
possible reasons why the brokers failed financially. Id. at 273.
167. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) ("The actor's negligent conduct
is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in
which his negligence has resulted in the harm."). The Comments go on to note:
The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has
such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a
cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of
responsibility, rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense," which includes
every one of the great number of events without which any happening would not
have occurred.
Id. § 431 cmt. a. Prosser and Keeton define the substantial factor proximate cause test as
requiring that "the defendant's tort must have been a substantial factor in producing the damage
complained of." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, § 42, at 278 (quoting Jeremiah Smith,
Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 223, 229 (1911) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). However, Prosser and Keeton expressed frustration at the use of the substan-
tial factor inquiry:
As applied to the facts of causation alone, the test though not ideal, may be thought
useful. But when the "substantial factor" is made to include all of the ill-defined
considerations of policy which go to limit liability once causation in fact is found,
it has no more definite meaning than "proximate cause," and it becomes a hindrance
rather than a help.
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our more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands, or of
what is administratively possible and convenient.""r Although this statement
of the traditional proximate cause doctrine lacks a definitive framework for
analysis, its flexibility is central to explaining how proximate cause must be
approached under civil RICO. Each proximate cause inquiry at common law
considered the particular public policy at issue) 69 Thus, the rigor of the
proximate cause approach varied on a case-by-case basis, depending in part
on the importance of the applicable public policy at issue. 7° RICO's private
attorney general provision,"' the failure of previous remedies to adequately
compensate RICO victims,' 72 and RICO's liberal construction clause"1 3 all
justify a more flexible approach to proving proximate cause than a narrow
insistence on reliance. With those principles in mind, we can resolve circuit
conflicts over victim reliance by elaborating upon and applying the Holmes
168. Id. § 41, at 264. The Holmes Court cited this observation with approval. Holmes,
503 U.S. at 268.
169. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, § 41, at 264 ("Often to greater extent,
however, the legal limitation on the scope of liability is associated with policy - with our more
or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively
possible and convenient."). Prosser and Keeton add:
[Proximate cause] is sometimes said to depend on whether the conduct has been so
significant and important a cause that the defendant should be legally responsible.
But both significance and importance turn upon conclusions in terms of legal pol-
icy, so that they depend on whether the policy of the law will extend the responsi-
bility for the conduct to the consequences which have in fact occurred.
Id. § 42, at 273 (emphasis added).
170. See id. § 42, at 279 ("'Proximate cause' cannot be reduced to absolute rules. No better
statement ever has been made concerning the problem than that of Street: 'It is always to be
determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice,
policy, and precedent.'" (quoting 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGALLIBERTY 110 (1906))).
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) ("Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.").
172. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (reviewing previous failure). Addition-
ally, allowing treble damages responds to a lack of governmental resources to combat RICO
violators. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) ("Private attorney
general provisions such as 1964(c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps .... [There
is a] need for treble damages as an incentive to litigate."). Thus, RICO's attorney general pro-
visions benefit both victims and society as a whole.
173. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) ("The provisions of [RICO] shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."). A liberal construction clause in a statute
is very rare. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,27 (1983) ("So far as we have been made
aware, this is the only substantive federal criminal statute that contains such a directive."). See
generally Craig W. Palm, Note, R]CO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
167 (1980) (arguing that congressional intent justifies liberally construing RICO).
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tripartite analysis in a manner consistent with RICO's civil enforcement
function and the common law notion of proximate cause.
B. Holmes: The Common Law and RICO
Justice Souter's majority opinion in Holmes fully recognized that the
proximate cause doctrine stems from a common law policy aimed at limiting
liability.' Holmes also acknowledged that proximate cause is a policy-based
principle of administrative convenience. 7 ' Based on the application of this
principle to analogous antitrust cases,176 the Supreme Court identified three
policy concerns central to proximate cause inquiries under civil RICO.'77
These policy concerns are (1) the difficulty in determining damages "attribut-
able to the [defendant's violations] as distinct from other, independent, fac-
tors,' 78 (2) the difficulty of "apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed
at different levels of injury from the violative acts,"'' 79 and (3) whether more
directly injured victims can be "counted on to vindicate the law as private
attorneys general."'80 The Supreme Court broadly framed these concerns in
terms of limiting liability to directly injured plaintiffs,'"' but if one under-
174. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 n.10, 268 (1992). Justice
Souter wrote:
In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the
causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. But any
attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite liability
for all wrongful acts, and would set society on edge and fill the courts with endless
litigation.
Id. at 266 n.10 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
175. Id. at 268.
176. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 531-37 (1983) (finding that Congress must have intended to import common law
causation concepts into antitrust statutes). Holmes indicated that "Congress modeled § 1964(c)
on the civil-action provision of the federal anti-trust laws.... " Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267.
177. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70 (identifying three policy concerns). In the antitrust
context, standing depends upon six factors. See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 924 (3d Cir. 1999) (identifying six factors from
Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537-38, 540, 542-44). The six factors are:
1) causal connection between defendant's acts and plaintiff's injuries; 2) presence of specific
intent, 3) whether the nature of plaintiff's injuries related to the purposes of the antitrust law;
4) directness of the injury; 5) how speculative the damages claimed are; and 6) ability to avoid
complex apportionment of damages or liability. Id.
178. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 269-70.
181. See id. at 269 ("Although such directness of relationship is not the sole requirement
of Clayton Act causation, it has been one of its central elements."). Holmes analyzed plaintiffs'
claims based on a direct versus indirect injury analysis.
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stands the concerns properly, they roughly approximate the common law
standards of substantial factor, remoteness, and direct versus indirect injury.
The Court's first concern in allowing indirectly injured parties to recover
is the difficulty of attributing damages to the defendant as distinct from
damages that others caused." 2 The common law's substantial factor inquiry
addresses this concern.183 The substantial factor inquiry determines whether
the defendant's actions were a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injuries.
If not, another party or source is legally responsible for the defendant's lia-
bility under the common law."8 4 The Court's second concern addresses the
difficulty of apportioning damages among plaintiffs "removed at different
levels of injury from the violative acts. '  Underlying this concern is the
"risk of multiple recoveries."""' The common law remoteness inquiry reduced
this risk by precluding recovery by remote victims.1 7 The Court's third con-
182. See id. at 269 (noting difficulty with indirect injuries in determining damages caused
by defendant as opposed to "independent factors"). The Court said:
If the nonpurchasing customers were allowed to sue, the district court would first
need to determine the extent to which their inability to collect from the broker-
dealers was the result of the alleged conspiracy to manipulate, as opposed to, say,
the broker-dealers' poor business practices or their failures to anticipate develop-
ments in the financial markets.
Id. at 272-73. Thus the inquiry becomes whether a plaintiff can demonstrate sufficiently the
particular defendant causing the injuries claimed.
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) ("The actor's negligent conduct
is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm."). Recovery is allowed only if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant's acts are the
legal cause of the plaintiff's harm.
184. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, at 268 ("If the defendant's conduct was a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it follows that he will not be absolved from
liability merely because the other causes have contributed to the result." (emphasis added)).
Thus, if the defendant's conduct was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's liability,
courts will absolve him from liability.
185. Holmes v. See. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992). Applying this
concern to Holmes's facts, the Court stated, "Assuming that an appropriate assessment of factual
causation could be made out, the district court would then have to find some way to apportion
the possible respective recoveries by the broker-dealers and the customers, who would other-
wise each be entitled to recover the full treble damages." Id. at 273.
186. Id. at 269. "The second concern addressed by the Holmes Court was the possibility
of double recovery of damages where more than one claimant is recognized." Mosesso, supra
note 158, at 303.
187. Remote is the opposite of proximate. Thus, some courts have considered the close-
ness of the defendant's actions. See City of Brady v. Finklea, 400 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1968)
(identifying time as one consideration to determine closeness). "[L]apse of time is but one ele-
ment to be considered along with all other relevant facts in the case." Id. Apparently the theory
is that the more time and distance that separate the plaintiff from the defendant's actions, the
more likely the defendant's acts were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Deny-
ing remote parties recovery minimizes the dangers of duplicative recovery. See Holmes, 503
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cern seeks to maximize the incentive to enforce civil RICO's private attorney
general function.e This approach is another formulation of the common
law's direct versus indirect injury inquiry, as the most directly injured party
ordinarily has the greatest motivation to file a RICO claim. Taken together,
these three concerns constitute a balanced approach to civil RICO proximate
cause that conforms with statutory text, public policy, and common-law doc-
trine. These concerns also explain why the Holmes Court declined to articu-
late a more definitive text for proximate cause."8 9
Thus, rather than base proximate cause on a rigid reliance rule, Holmes
established that this element should be governed by a tripartite analysis de-
signed to select the best plaintiff to fulfill RICO's private attorney general
function."ra In contrast, the reliance test for proximate cause often excludes
the best private enforcer from filing suit and sometimes denies standing to all
victims of civil racketeering.' 9 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Summit Prop-
U.S. at 269 (allowing indirect injury claims that would complicate rules that prevent multiple
recovery).
188. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70 (discussing third concern). When denying RICO
standing to the plaintiff, the Court stated, "[T]hose directly injured, the broker-dealers, could
be counted on to bring suit for the [RICO's] vindication." Id. at 273.
189. See id. at 274 n.20 ("The infinite variety of claims that may arise make it virtually
impossible to announce a black letter rule that will dictate the result in every case." (quoting
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536
(1983))).
190. In the present context, the term, "best plaintiff," necessarily means the best RICO
plaintiff. Certainly, the availability of alternative non-RICO remedies should not defeat RICO
standing for otherwise qualified RICO plaintiffs. In enacting the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, of which RICO was Title IX, Congress expressly recognized the inadequacies existing
in the law at that time. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 (Finding (5) (1970)). Congress in-
tended RICO to supplement the remedies already available. See id. § 904(a) & (b); cf Califor-
nia v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93,104 (1989) (finding that in antitrust contest, direct/indirect
distinction is designed to select best plaintiff to enforce antitrust remedy); Sports Racing Seres.,
Inc. v. Sports Car Club ofAm., 131 F.3d 874, 889 (10th Cir. 1997) (same).
Two circuits have ignored or misapplied this principle, finding instead that the existence
of other state remedies preclude RICO standing for an indirectly injured plaintiff who was
otherwise best situated to sue under RICO. See Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Callahan v. AE.V., Inc.,
182 F.3d 237, 266-67 (3d Cir. 1999). This violates the notion that "RICO's statutory language
reflects congressional intent to supplement, rather than supplant, existing crimes and penalties."
United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Pub. L. No. 91452,
§ 904(b), 84 Stat 947 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (same).
191. See Summit Props., Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 214 F.3d 556,562 (5thCir. 2000)
(affirming trial court's dismissal of claims by owners of property with defective plumb-
ing systems and leaving no plaintiff to effectuate RICO's purposes), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1132 (2001). In tobacco litigation, there is often no plaintiff able to sue under RICO because
courts refuse to find standing in the case of insurance funds. See infra Part VI.C (discussing
Summit).
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erties, Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp. manifests this unfortunate byproduct
of the rigid reliance rule."9
C. Summit Properties, Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.193
Summit exemplifies the consequences of a rigid reliance rule and a refusal
to abide byHolmes. In Summit, plaintiff property owners brought RICO claims
against industry defendants who allegedly made false claims in marketing poly-
butylene plumbing systems to various contractors. 194 Several systems failed
after installation, and the affected property owners sued the industry defen-
dants. 195
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's civil
RICO claims, 19 reasoning that plaintiffs failed to show proximate cause
because they never detrimentally relied upon the defendants' fraudulent state-
ments. " In reaching this result, the Fifth Circuit maintained that no prior
circuit case law had considered this issue."' At best, this reasoning was
192. See Summit, 214 F.3d at 562 (affirming dismissal of RICO claim).
193. 214 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2000).
194. See id. at 558 (stating facts).
195. See id. (stating claim).
196. See id. at 562 (affirming lower court's dismissal). The district court's decision to
dismiss plaintiff's RICO claims resulted from faulty reasoning that extended beyond a threshold
reliance inquiry. Additionally, the district court apparently held that RICO plaintiffs must also
be the direct recipients of the misrepresentations. Summit Props., Inc. v. Hoechst-Celanese
Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 205,208 (S.D. Tex. 1999), aff'd, 214 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Court concludes... absent an allegation that Defendants made material mis-
representations to Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs relied on the mail and wire fraud on
which the Civil RICO claims are predicated, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the proximate
causation requirement for purposes of Civil RICO. As a result, Plaintiffs [sic] Civil
RICO claim must be dismissed.
Id. (emphasis added). The district adopted the minority rule on "convergence," which requires
that the misrepresentation be made to the person from whom the property was obtained. The
better rule rejects convergence. See, e.g., United States v. Christopher, 142 F.3d 46, 52-53 (1st
Cir. 1998).
197. See Summit Props., Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 214 F.3d 556,560 (5th Cir. 2000)
("Nevertheless, the plaintiffs came into possession of PB systems without relying on the alleged
fraud. Whether they received their systems from the manufacturers or from prior property
owners, any past fraud was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' resulting injuries since fraud
did not induce the purchase transactions."), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1132 (2001).
198. See id. at 558-59 (distinguishing prior case law). The Fifth Circuit stated:
The question before us is whether a plaintiff's reliance on the predicate mail or wire
fraud is necessary in order to establish proximate causation. In Armco Industries
Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., this court distinguished mail fraud under
RICO from common law fraud and stated that "to find a violation of the federal
mail fraud statute it is not necessary that the victim have detrimentally relied on the
mailed misrepresentations." Ours is a different question.
Id. (citation omitted).
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disingenuous because prior Fifth Circuit case law had squarely held that a
RICO claim based on mail or wire fraud did not require reliance.' Moreover,
by imposing a reliance requirement for proximate cause, the court miscon-
ceived the Holmes doctrine." °
Proper application of the tripartite proximate cause analysis contemplated
by Holmes produces a different result. First, the facts and circumstances of
Summit pose no difficulty in distinguishing between damages caused by
defendants' alleged RICO violations and damages caused by others. For
example, plaintiffs did not allege incorrect installment of the plumbing sys-
tems. Rather, the systems were simply "worthless.0 01 All damages allegedly
resulted from systematic defects that the defendants fraudulently hid from the
contractors who installed them.
The second Holmes inquiry also supports plaintiffs' proximate cause
claim. As Summit posed no difficulty apportioning damages among plaintiffs
with different levels of injury, no risk of double recovery existed. 2°1 Unlike
199. See Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 482 (5th Cir.
1986) ("To find a violation of the federal mail fraud statute it is not necessary that the victim
have detrimentally relied on the mailed misrepresentations. Indeed, the intended victim need
not even have been defrauded for liability to attach under the mail fraud statute." (citation
omitted)). In Summit, the court simply imposed an additional requirement to the predicate act
requirement. "[T]he government can punish unsuccessful schemes to defraud because the
underlying mail fraud violation does not require reliance, but a civil plaintiff 'faces an addi-
tional hurdle' and must show an injury caused 'by reason of' the violation." Summit, 214 F.3d
at 559 (citation omitted). Defendants' acts can cause injury without reliance.
200. See supra notes 174-92 and accompanying text (observing that Holmes did not require
reliance to prove proximate cause). Courts further aggravate this problem when they insist upon
"reasonable" reliance. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1996)
(unreasonable for buyer to rely on Florida real estate agent's misrepresentation). In effect, this
"reasonable reliance" standard absolves perpetrators who commit crimes against especially
vulnerable victims. The better rule stands against a "reasonable reliance" requirement. See, e.g.,
United States v. Circone, 219 F.3d 1078,1083 (9th Cir. 2000). Tothe degree that reliance is ever
an appropriate measure of proximate cause in two-party transactions, the standard should be
"justifiable" rather than "reasonable reliance." Cf. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59,69,70-76 (1995).
201. Summit, 214 F.3d at 558. The Summit court stated:
[PIlaintiffs allege... that PB plumbing is worse than worthless, that it not only
fails to perform its intended function, but also that it causes severe property dam-
age; that PB's inherent defects render it unsuitable for use as a water distribution
system, including the fact that after installation, such systems degrade, crack, leak,
and spray water.
Id.
202. The court never identified another party that incurred damages. The building inspec-
tors faced no liabilities to third parties resulting from defendants' misrepresentations, nor had
the building inspectors suffered any damages to their business or property. Additionally, the
court failed to articulate how the contractors who installed the defective systems suffered
damage. Apparently, only the property owners suffered directly from the defendants' alleged
misstatements.
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Holmes, in which more directly injured parties also sued,203 Summit never con-
sidered whether the contractors filed suit against the industry defendants. Al-
though the defendants fraudulently induced the contractors to provide defec-
tive systems, the property owners ultimately incurred the costs of paying for
and removing the defective systems as well as installing new ones. The court
could determine the costs with reasonable certainty, and the facts in the case
posed no risk of duplicative recovery.
The third Holmes concern considers whether the court could rely upon
another injured victim to vindicate the law as private attorney general. °4 In
Summit, the court failed to inquire, much less identify, anyone other than the
property owners motivated to vindicate RICO's civil provisions. 5 Because
the contractors suffered no direct injury, they lacked incentives to act as
private attorney generals. Conversely, the property owners stuck with useless
plumbing systems were ideally situated and motivated to fulfill RICO's
enforcement function.
In sum, because the Fifth Circuit failed to apply the Holmes tripartite
analysis, it denied standing to the only victims in a position to seek redress
under civil RICO. By comparison, Holmes reflects an approach designed to
identify the party in the best position to fulfill RICO's enforcement function.
For example, to the extent that Holmes embodied prior case law, numerous
courts properly denied standing to indirectly injured parties because others
were better situated to implement the statutory objective of deterring racke-
teering activity." Thus, as Holmes itself illustrates, the tripartite analysis
does not threaten traditional proximate cause principles by conferring standing
upon all persons adversely affected by racketeering activity.
Moreover, for the Holmes tripartite analysis to promote proper proximate
cause determinations in RICO cases, courts must apply it objectively with due
consideration to the statutory goal of deterring racketeering activity. The
Ninth Circuit's decision in Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare
Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. 7 (Oregon Laborers Trust Fund) illustrates
203. See Holmes v. See. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,273 (1992) (noting that more
directly injured broker-dealers also had brought suit against defendants).
204. See id. at 269-70 ("[D]irectly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate
the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plain-
tiffs injured more remotely.").
205. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (noting lack of potential claimants after
court denies plaintiff standing).
206. Cf Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing cases
from various circuit courts denying RICO standing to shareholders of corporation); Carter v.
Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1176-78 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying RICO standing for taxpayer); Warren
v. Mfrs. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 759 F.2d 542, 545 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating shareholder and
employee not entitled to RICO standing).
207. 185 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999).
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the consequences of applying proximate cause principles without regard to
RICO objectives.
D. Oregon Laborers Trust Fund
Plaintiffs in Oregon Laborers Trust Fundwere a collection of labor union,
health, and welfare trust funds (the funds) suing various tobacco companies to
recover increased costs stemming from the tobacco industry's alleged decep-
tive practices in promoting smoking. °" The funds claimed to have incurred
damages because defendants' fraudulent conduct "resulted in higher incidence
of disease and higher expenditures for medical bills by plaintiffs. 2°' The funds
argued that these increased expenditures occurred because the industry's
frauds "prevented plaintiffs from obtaining accurate information... which in
turn prevented plaintiffs from taking action to reduce smoking rates among
their participants."21° More specifically, the funds alleged that but for the
tobacco companies' misrepresentations, plaintiffs would have implemented
stop smoking campaigns and other programs to reduce their insured's smoking
rates. 21' Such initiatives by the funds allegedly would have reduced their
expenditures for health insurance benefits. 1 2
In reviewing defendants' motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit first con-
sidered whether more directly injured victims of the alleged RICO violations
would likely seek relief against the tobacco industry, and the court concluded
that injured smokers were better situated to file suit.213 This reasoning, how-
ever, disavowed two critical features of RICO. First, as civil RICO authorizes
recovery only for damages to business and property, defrauded smokers could
sue for personal injuries only under state law.214 Second, as RICO limits relief
to business and property damages, the funds were the only victims in a posi-
tion to vindicate this interest. More fundamentally, the court's reliance on the
possibility of other forms of relief for smokers cannot be reconciled with
208. See Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185
F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating facts).
209. Id. at 962.
210. Id.
211. See id. (stating claim).
212. See id. (stating claim).
213. See id. at 964 ("The existence of the smokers, who are more direct victims of the
alleged wrongful conduct and who can be counted on to vindicate the injury caused by defen-
dants' alleged wrong conduct, weighs heavily in favor of barring plaintiffs' actions.").
214. See id. ("Plaintiffs are correct that individuals that suffer personal injury cannot claim
medical expenses as 'injury to business or property,' and that the smokers are therefore barred
from asserting RICO or antitrust claims."). RICO states, "Any person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court...." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
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congressional findings characterizing RICO as supplementing pre-existing
remedies that had proven inadequate. 15 In contrast, the Holmes Court articu-
lated its tripartite analysis with a full appreciation of RICO's legislative
context and objectives.216
The Oregon Laborers Trust Fund court, however, also premised its
ruling on two other features of the Holmes standard.2" The Ninth Circuit
noted the difficulty of attributing plaintiffs' damages (payment of health bene-
fits) exclusively to the defendants. 21 ' Because plaintiffs' losses reflected the
insureds' smoking habits, the funds would have to distinguish between dam-
ages caused by the defendants' alleged fraud and payments that would have
continued despite anti-smoking efforts.2" 9 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
found that this Holmes factor - difficulty of apportioning damages - weighed
in favor of rejecting proximate causation.' °
215. One may find RICO's purpose at Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-952, 84 Stat 922-23.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools... and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
Id. at 923. RICO was necessary because "the sanctions and remedies available to the Govern-
ment are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact" Id.
216. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 & n.15 (1992) (dis-
cussing tripartite analysis).
217. See Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185
F.3d 957,964-66 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying Holmes analysis).
218. See id. at 966 ("Although the smokers cannot recover under either RICO or the anti-
trust laws, they can seek recovery under other state law theories for personal injury and the
associated medical costs - the same damages that plaintiffs seek to recover.").
219. See id. at 965 (noting difficulty of such distinctions).
It will be virtually impossible for plaintiffs to prove with any certainty: (1) the
effect any smoking cessation programs or incentives would have had on the number
of smokers among the plan beneficiaries; (2) the countereffect that the tobacco
companies' direct fraud would have had on the smokers, despite the best efforts of
the Funds; and (3) other reasons why individual smokers would continue smoking,
even after having been informed of the dangers of smoking and having been offered
smoking cessation programs. On a fundamental level, these difficulties of proving
damages stem from the agency of the individual smokers in deciding whether, and
how frequently, to smoke. In this light, the direct injury test can be seen as wisely
limiting standing to sue to those situations where the chain of causation leading to
damages is not complicated by the intervening agency of third parties (here, the
smokers) from whom the plaintiffs' injuries derive.
Id. (citation omitted).
220. See id. (stating that Holmes's second factor "weigh[ed] heavily" in favor of barring
plaintiff's actions).
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The Ninth Circuit premised this aspect of its conclusion on the "virtual[ ]
impossibil[ity]" of plaintiffs being able to prove damages with "any certain-
ty."'22 Proof difficulties, however, are not grounds for dismissal of a com-
plaint. Rather, motions to dismiss must be gauged by assuming plaintiffs
allegations to be true and reading the complaint in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party.222 Problems attendant to proof, therefore, are properly
considered only at summary judgment or trial. Moreover, using theories of
aggregation and statistical modeling, plaintiffs might well have met their
burden of proof. '
The final Holmes factor, in the court's opinion, also weighed against
proximate causation. 4 The Ninth Circuit noted that tobacco litigation was
particularly vulnerable to the possibility of duplicative recovery for the same
damages.22 For example, a smoker/insured could sue the tobacco companies
directly and recover the same damages for medical payments as the funds.225
221. Id. (citation omitted).
222. See H.J., Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,249-50 (1989) (discussing standard
on motion to dismiss).
Because respondents prevailed on a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(bX6), we read the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to
petitioners. And we may only affirm the dismissal of the complaint if "it is clear that
no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with
the allegations."
Id. at 249-50 (citation omitted).
223. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 1999)
("Statistical methods could provide a decent answer - likely a more accurate answer than is
possible when addressing the equivalent causation question in a single person's suit."); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560, 575 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (drawing distinction from Holmes where it was nearly impossible to determine break-
down of factors causing damages).
[T]he Blues are likely to have extensive documentation with respect to the medical care
they have provided to their insureds.... The aggregation of millions of alleged
injuries in the instant suit can be expected to yield more accurate results with respect
to the causation issue since projections based upon a large statistical base will be
available, thus reducing the size of the possible error.
Id. at 575 (citations omitted); see also Mosesso, supra note 158, at 333-34 (discussing damages
calculation).
224. See Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185
F.3d 957, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1999) (considering third factor).
Moreover, although there may be some protection from multiple recovery in state law,
this safeguard would not cure the ultimate problem - that the courts would be forced
to "adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs at different levels
of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries."
Id. (citation omitted).
225. See id. (observing that state laws against duplicative recovery may be insufficient to
avoid Holmes's third concern).
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This view, however, improperly blurs the common law collateral source
rule with RICO proximate cause principles. The collateral source rule entitles
tort plaintiffs to recover for medical expenses reimbursed by a third party.226
As a threshold matter, however, this rule does not ordinarily duplicate recov-
eries because third party providers often recoup their expenses from plaintiffs
who have won personal injuryjudgments. 227 Moreover, the concern in Holmes
was the risk of duplicative recovery under RICO, not other state remedies. 2"
Indeed, as the collateral source rule plays no role in conventional proxi-
mate cause analysis, there is no reason to treat it as an obstacle to proximate
cause under civil RICO. On the contrary, the public policy for this rule pro-
motes RICO objectives. Collateral source recovery is premised upon the
deterrence principle that tortfeasors should not benefit from precautions that
a plaintiff might have taken to minimize the economic consequences of tort
injury. 9 Because deterrence principles likewise undergird civil RICO, the
It is quite likely that if there are not cases by smokers already pending in Oregon,
there will likely be many filed as has been seen in other states. Although the
smokers cannot recover under either RICO or the antitrust laws, they can seek
recovery under other state law theories for personal injury and the associated
medical costs - the same damages that plaintiffs seek to recover.
Id. at 965-66.
226. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 3.8(1) (2d ed. 1993) ("The general rule is
that benefits received by the plaintiff from a source collateral to the defendant may not be used
to reduce that defendant's liability for damages.").
The usual case is one in which the plaintiff is injured by the defendant's tort but
suffers no actual medical expense loss because those expenses are paid for by the
plaintiff's own medical insurance or paid for as part of government benefits to
veterans. In these cases the rule is quite firm that the defendant must pay for the
reasonable value of medical services reasonably required even though the plaintiff's
own insurance has paid for such services.
Id. at 267.
227. Through subrogation, insurance companies often attach liens to any settlement or
judgment for expenses paid by the insurer. Id. at 268. Although the plaintiff recovers the medi-
cal expenses paid by the insurer from the defendant, the plaintiff then must pay the insurer for
monies paid on the plaintiff's behalf. Id. In fact, one of the justifications for the collateral
source rule is that it "preserves subrogation rights of any insurer who paid benefits to the plain-
tiff." Id.
228. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(b), 84 Stat. 947
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) ("Nothing in [RICO] shall supersede
any provision of Federal... law imposing criminal penalties... in addition to those provided
for in [RICO]."); see also United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1992)
("RICO's statutory language reflects congressional intent to supplement, rather than supplant,
existing crimes and penalties."); supra note 190 and accompanying text (noting congressional
intent in enacting RICO).
229. If the plaintiff purchases insurance, and the defendant were allowed a credit for the
insurer's payment, then the defendant would benefit from the plaintiff's diligence in obtaining
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rationale for the collateral source rule applies equally in this context. At the
very least, this deterrence-based rule should not preclude the right even to seek
relief for racketeering violations under the guise of proximate cause principles.
Notwithstanding its failures, however, the Ninth Circuit's analysis in
Oregon Laborers Trust Fund at least recognized that the Holmes tripartite
analysis governs proximate cause inquiries under RICO.230 In this respect, the
decision represents significant improvement, as most courts have misunder-
stood Holmes and resolved the proximate cause issue by looking exclusively
to the reliance element.231 As such, Oregon Laborers Trust Fund holds
considerable promise. To the extent that future judges recognize that Holmes
provides the framework for resolving proximate cause determinations, they
eventually will produce a body of case law that applies this framework in a
manner consistent with the goals of civil RICO. 2
insurance. "[It is argued that the wrongdoer should not have a windfall, which would be his
if he got credit for a benefit that reduced the plaintiff's damages." DOBBS, supra note 226,
§ 3.8(1).
230. See Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185
F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing applicability of Holmes's tripartite analysis).
231. See supra Part V (detailing reliance holdings).
232. To some degree this is already happening. Although they represent only a small
fraction of post-Holmes decisions, a few district courts have demonstrated that they readily can
resolve proximate cause inquiries by applying the Holmes tripartite analysis with RICO's objec-
tives in mind.
After rigorously applying the Holmes tripartite analysis, several district courts have denied
standing to potential RICO plaintiffs. See, e.g., Chera v. Chera, No. 99-CV-7101(JO), 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13749 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2000) (denying standing to brother claiming unequal
partnership distributions); Browne v. Abdelhak, No. 98-6688, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12064
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2000) (denying standing to donors to charitable foundation); Legal Aid Soc'y
v. City of New York, 114 F. Supp. 2d 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying Holmes's tripartite
standard to determine proximate cause in § 1983 action); Attorney General of Canada v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, 103 F. Supp. 2d 134 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (deeming that injuries of
Attorney General were indirect), affrd, No. 00-7972,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21775 (2d Cir. Oct.
12,2001); Medgar Evers Houses Tenants Ass'n v. Medgar Evers House Assocs., 25 F. Supp. 2d
116 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying standing to tenants and homeowners because HUD was more
directly injured); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D. Mass. 1998) (denying
standing to owners of buildings with defective insulation); Kaiser v. Stewart, 965 F. Supp. 684
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (denying standing to liquidator of insurance company); Barr Labs. v. Quantum
Pharms., 827 F. Supp. 111 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying standing to drug manufacturer competitor).
Some district courts have granted RICO standing based on a proper application of
Holmes's tripartite analysis. See, e.g., Sys. Mgmt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 91 F. Supp. 2d 401 (D. Mass.
2000) (granting standing to employees); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Abrams, No. 96-C-
6365, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1524 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2000) (granting standing to auto insurer
against participants of staged accidents); Spitzer v. Abdelhak, No. 98-6475, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19110 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 1999) (allowing employees' RICO claims to go forward);
Rodriguez v. McKinney, 878 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (granting standing to students of
technical school).
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VII. Conclusion
Justice Frankfurter wisely observed, "In law ... the right answer usually
depends on putting the right question." 3  This observation explains the
present proximate cause controversy under civil RICO. The victim reliance
controversy stems from judges asking whether plaintiffs can prove they relied
on fraudulent misrepresentations rather than asking whether plaintiffs can
demonstrate proximate cause. Those courts that measure proximate cause
exclusively by looking to victim reliance fail to appreciate that victim reliance
is sufficient - but not always necessary - to show proximate cause." As
Holmes demonstrates, a variety of other factors also can prove this point.
These factors, which represent an amalgam of traditional common law princi-
ples with unique RICO objectives, are preferable to a unitary standard that
rigidly reads a reliance element into the statute.
Given the multitude of way to perpetrate frauds without effecting direct
victim reliance, neither the mail nor wire statutes make reliance an element
of proof. Ironically, by limiting civil RICO standing to plaintiffs who directly
relied on fraudulent misrepresentations, the judiciary has completed a cycle
of cases which began with circuit decisions holding that RICO affords relief
only to indirectly injured victims. The Supreme Court summarily rejected
this initial line of authority as nonsensical.235 Public policy is equally ill-
served by a judicial standard that effectively immunizes vast categories of
fraudulent conduct from civil liability merely because the crimes could be
effectuated without direct representations. Based on a century of federal fraud
jurisprudence to the contrary and the remedial objectives of civil RICO, 236
courts can readily resolve the rift over victim reliance by heeding Justice
Frankfurter's advice and asking the right question.
233. Estate of Rogers v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 410,413 (1943).
234. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (stating that proof of reliance is not only
way to establish proximate cause).
235. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,499 (1985) (rejecting indirect injury
claim); see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (showing Second Circuit case that required
indirect injury as prerequisite to bringing suit).
236. RICO is a remedial statute. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 ("The statute's 'remedial
purposes' are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private action for those injured
by racketeering activity.").
